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Abstract 
The Master of Public Health (MPH) capstone experience results in numerous personal 
and academic gains.   Through my MPH capstone experience, I was able to utilize knowledge 
gained from previously related classes.   I gained exposure and understanding of the risks and 
hazards of zoonotic disease research, especially as it relates to attenuated Rift Valley fever virus 
(MP-12) in a Biosafety Level (BSL)-2 Research Facility.  I was also able to achieve an 
understanding of what procedures should be in place to protect the occupational safety of 
workers in the laboratory or research setting. Finally, in a Frontier trip to the United States-
Mexico Border Port of Entry in Santa Teresa, New Mexico, I was able to observe the real life 
activities, issues, and actions, which occur on a daily basis to protect and defend this nation’s 
public health and food supply. 
 The risk of foreign animal or zoonotic disease outbreaks are high today and may be 
rising.  The reasons involved include increased international trade and travel, population growth, 
the changing patterns of human-animal contact, an increased demand for animal protein, 
increased wealth, environmental changes and human encroachment of farm land and previously 
undisturbed wildlife habitat.  Infectious disease outbreaks can cause human suffering/death and 
substantial economic losses to the agricultural sectors resulting in disrupted agricultural 
commodity markets.  Zoonotic diseases such as those caused by Rift Valley fever virus (RVFV) 
can spread from humans to animals and vice-versa, raising an additional dimension of 
vulnerability to human health.  Rift Valley fever virus is not considered an immediate risk to the 
continental United States; however, it is considered a possible threat and, if established, could 
result in similar consequences as West Nile Virus (WNV) in 1999.  Its socioeconomic impact 
  
and significant effect on human health and livestock could resemble the economically crippling 
effect seen in countries, such as those in Africa.  This impact is seen in the form of stressed 
health care services, decreased animal reproduction, and financial loss due to human and animal 
morbidity and mortality, and national as well as international trade restrictions. 
Through the understanding of RVFV’s global importance and the application of zoonotic 
agent laboratory research, I was able to produce two PowerPoint presentations, which will be 
useful as training exercises for new laboratory workers starting with the Arthropod-Borne 
Animal Disease Research Unit (ABADRU).  Additionally, I was able to participate in the 
preliminary occupational risk evaluation of an intradermal needle-free injection device, for the 
potential use in future ABADRU work. 
 
Report Organization 
This report is arranged with an abstract, general introduction, literature review, 
occupational biosafety review, field experience review, one individual paper, and three 
appendixes.  Two of the appendixes are prepared PowerPoints for future laboratory workers at 
the USDA CGAHR ABADRU and the last is a daily log of activities during the field experience.  
The paper was conducted for in-house purposes as preliminary research and is organized as 
follows: An abstract, introduction, materials and methods, results, discussion/conclusion.  
References cited in the literature review and respective chapters are located at the end of each 
section, after the tables and figures.  All reference citations follow the American Psychological 
Association (APA) format.   
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Chapter 1 - General Introduction 
Introduction 
The zoonotic threat of Rift Valley fever virus (RVFV) has the potential to be both 
financially and epidemically devastating (Clements, et al, 2007; Sindato, et al, 2011). Rift Valley 
fever is an arthropod-borne infection causing acute hemorrhagic fever resulting in viral disease 
among humans and ruminants (Gerdes, 2002; Gerdes, 2004; Hartley, et al, 2011; Ikegami & 
Makino, 2011; Musser, et al, 2006).  This virus is a medically and agriculturally important 
pathogen in Africa (Hughes-Fraire, et al, 2011; Schamljohn & Hooper, 2001).  Rift Valley fever 
virus periodically causes outbreaks in humans and in ruminants, including sheep, cattle, and 
goats (Hartley, et al, 2011; Ikegami & Makino, 2011; Mullen & Durden, 2009; Sindato, et al, 
2011).  Rift Valley fever epidemics are characterized by livestock mortality and abortion in 
pregnant animals (Clements, et al, 2007; Woods, et al, 2002).  A RVFV outbreak results in 
significant human morbidity, livestock mortality and major economic disruption – largely due to 
livestock losses and trade restrictions (Clements, et al, 2007; Hartley, et al, 2011; Hughes-Fraire, 
et al, 2011; Sindato, et al, 2011; Terrell, et al, 2008).  In the Kenya, Africa RVFV outbreak of 
2006/2007, the total economic losses from livestock mortality in this outbreak were estimated to 
be $7.6 million with national economic losses estimated to be $26 million (MacMillian, 2010).  
Traders and slaughterhouses are affected by movement bans on livestock and decreased 
consumer demand for meat, which greatly affects sales of live animals and products 
(MacMillian, 2010; Mohamed, et al, 2010; Sindato, et al, 2011).   
Rift Valley fever virus is one of the most important veterinary pathogens in the world and 
has the potential to cause lethal epidemics in sheep and cattle, as well as severe human disease 
epidemics (Archer, et al, 2011; CDC, 2012; Murphy, et al, 1999; Strauss & Strauss, 2008).  It 
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can also cause high mortality in new-born animals and abortion in pregnant animals (Bird, et al, 
2009; Swanepoel and Coetzer, 2004).  From 1977-1978, an epizootic in Egypt infected 25-50% 
of cattle and sheep in some areas, killing hundreds of thousands of sheep, goats, and cattle; 
causing food shortages for many years (Otte, et al, 2004; Strauss & Strauss, 2008).  In addition, 
the Egyptian epizootic resulted in 200,000 reported human cases and resulted in at least 600 
deaths (0.3%) (Clements, et al, 2007; Otte, et al, 2004; Schamljohn & Hooper, 2001; Strauss & 
Strauss, 2008; WHO, 2010).  After this outbreak, RVFV extended its range and in 1987, 
Mauritania and Senegal experienced a large epidemic which caused more than 200 human deaths 
(WHO, 2010). 
In 1997-1998, East Africa received the largest rainfall documented in 35 years, 60-100 
times the normal precipitation in some areas (Anyamba, et al, 2009; Mondet, et al, 2005; Wood, 
et al, 2002).  This phenomenon resulted in high arthropod populations and a subsequent large 
epidemic involving 5 countries with approximately 90,000 human infections; including 478 
deaths, a loss of approximately 100,000 domestic animals, and a significant economic impact 
due to a ban of livestock exports from the region (Anyamba, et al, 2009; Clements, et al, 2007; 
Gerdes, 2002; Mondet, et al, 2005; Wood, et al, 2002).   Hundreds of human hemorrhagic fever 
cases were recorded and sheep and goat mortalities reached 70%, while 20-30% of cattle and 
camels were lost (Clements, et al, 2007; CDC, 2012; Hartley, et al, 2011; Strauss & Strauss, 
2008).  In 2000, Saudi Arabia and Yemen had an outbreak resulting in more than 3,500 human 
cases, including 208 fatalities (WHO, 2010).  Rift Valley fever virus later hit the Horn of Africa 
in 2006 causing 350 human deaths (WHO, 2010; Hughes-Fraire, et al, 2011).   Furthermore, in 
2007-2008, an outbreak in Sudan resulted in 230 human deaths (WHO, 2010; Hughes-Fraire, et 
al, 2011). 
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The National Institute for Communicable Diseases (NICD) recently published 
information on a Rift Valley fever outbreak occurring in South Africa during 2010.This outbreak 
resulted in 238 human infections, including 26 human deaths, 14,342 animal cases, and 8,877 
laboratory-confirmed deaths across 8 of the 9 South African provinces (NICD, 2011).  However, 
these numbers only represent laboratory confirmed RVFV cases and only symptomatic people 
were tested; it is estimated that greater than 80% of RVFV infections are asymptomatic (NICD, 
2011).  Additionally, NICD data suggests approximately 82% of the reported cases worked with 
occupations in direct contact with animals (NICD, 2011).  Contact with livestock has been 
statistically associated with acute infection of RVFV, which indicates direct contact during an 
outbreak is an important means of disease spread to humans (Archer, et al, 2011; Gerdes, 2002; 
Mullen & Durden, 2009; Strauss & Strauss, 2008).  Furthermore, the virus is potentially 
infectious by aerosol and can replicate in a wide range of mosquito species including Aedes 
mcintoshi, Aedes vexans, Culicoides sonorensis, as well as other Aedes, Culex, Eretmapoites, 
and Mansonia species as well as other vectors such as sand flies (Fontenille, et al, 1998; Gaff, et 
al, 2007; Hartley, et al, 2011; Turell, et al, 2008).     
Rift Valley fever virus is restricted to certain national laboratories for all research and 
diagnostic procedures to prevent human exposure (Hughes-Fraire, et al, 2011; Murphy, et al, 
1999). It is important that research be conducted in secure laboratories to safely develop and 
produce control measures and preform diagnostics to protect public health as well as the U.S. 
livestock industries (Hughes-Fraire, et al, 2011; Turell, et al, 2008). As can be seen from the 
above reports, RVFV constitutes an important public health problem as well as a serious 
socioeconomic burden in Africa and surrounding areas, with the potential to become globally 
significant. 
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
Importance 
The introduction of West Nile virus (WNV) in 1999 and its spread across North America 
has demonstrated the ability of an exotic arbovirus to be introduced and rapidly spread across 
North America (Mandell & Flick, 2011; Nash, et al, 2001; Turell, et al, 2008).  Within six years 
of its introduction, WNV became endemic across the continental United States (U.S.) (Murray, 
et al, 2010).  The successful spread of WNV was due to a competent mosquito vector present in 
the U.S. (Hartley, et al, 2011; Turell, et al, 2008).  There is little known about the potential for 
North American mosquitoes to transmit Rift Valley fever virus (RVFV) should it be introduced 
into North America (Hartley, et al, 2011; Turell, et al, 2008).  However, there are a number of 
studies that have been conducted in order to evaluate selected mosquitos’ ability to transmit and 
serve as potential vectors for RVFV (Gargan, et al, 1988; Turell, et al, 2008).   
Rift Valley fever virus is viewed as a major disease threat to the U.S. because it has 
become endemic in a number of countries that previously were disease-free (Clements, et al, 
2007; Hughes-Fraire, et al, 2011; WHO, 2010).  There are researchers who believe humans 
returning from an infected part of the world could be incubating RVFV and, once within our 
borders, develop a full-blown viremia (Kurkjian, et al, 2006).  Mosquitos, could then 
theoretically pick up and transmit the virus to other humans and ruminant livestock, much as 
what happened with WNV (Kurkjian, et al, 2006).  Infectious disease experts fear RVFV could 
come to the U.S. or Europe and cause major human suffering and devastate the livestock 
industry in affected areas (Kurkjian, et al, 2006; Ikegami & Makino, 2011; UTMB, 2012). 
Due to the potential catastrophic side effects, including human morbidity, livestock 
mortality, and significant economic damage RVFV is a reportable zoonotic virus to the World 
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Organization of Animal Health also called the Office of International Epizootics (OIE) 
(Clements, et al, 2007; Musser, et al, 2006).  The virus is also a restricted pathogen and 
importation or possession of RVFV is prohibited by law or regulation by most national 
governments (Clements, et al, 2007; Murphy, et al, 1999; Spickler & Roth, 2006).  Because of 
these regulations, RVFV is restricted to certain national laboratories for all research and 
diagnostic procedures to prevent human exposure (Hughes-Fraire, et al, 2011; Murphy, et al, 
1999).  An overview for laboratory workers at ABADRU can be seen in Appendix B. 
 
History of Disease 
Rift Valley fever virus is a member of Bunyaviridae, one of the largest families of 
enveloped viruses, with 350 members, including the well-known Hantaviruses (Clements, et al, 
2007; Sindato, et al, 2011; Turell, et al, 2008).  Bunyaviruses are normally carried and 
transmitted by arthropods or rodents (Ikegami & Makino, 2011; Ikegami & Makino, 2009; 
Miller, 2008).  These arthropods include mosquitoes, ticks, culicoides, or flies (Murphy, et al, 
1999).  Often Bunyaviruses cause transient infection in their vertebrate hosts and lifelong 
persistent infections in their arthropod vectors (Ikegami & Makino, 2011; Murphy, et al, 1999).  
Most Bunyaviruses never impact humans or domestic animals, but there are three which cause 
important diseases ranging from encephalitis and hepatitis to acute respiratory disease (Ikegami 
& Makino, 2011; Murphy, et al, 1999).  These diseases include Rift Valley fever virus (RVFV), 
Crimean-Congo Hemorrhagic fever virus (CCHF) (disease transmitted via ticks to humans), and 
Nairobi Sheep Disease virus (NSDV) (disease transmitted via ticks to sheep and goats in Africa) 
(Murphy, et al, 1999).   Other arthropod-borne viruses in other families of importance include 
Bluetongue Virus (BTV) (disease of sheep characterized by edema and hemorrhage), Epizootic 
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Hemorrhagic Disease Virus (EHDV) (disease considered closely related to BTV, strongly 
affecting wild ruminants), and Cache Valley Virus (CVV) (disease of sheep characterized by 
fetal death) (Ikegami & Makino, 2011; Murphy, et al, 1999).   These viruses have gained both 
national and international disease control agencies’ attention (Ikegami & Makino, 2011; Murphy, 
et al, 1999).    
Though there are many exotic arboviruses affecting humans and animals alike, of 
particular concern is Rift Valley fever virus, which has been responsible for numerous outbreaks 
of severe disease in humans and ruminants in sub-Saharan Africa over the past 70 years (Hartley, 
et al, 2011 Ikegami & Makino, 2011; Turell, et al, 2008).   The geographic distribution of Rift 
Valley fever virus covers much of Africa, having been documented in Kenya, Somalia, 
Tanzania, Egypt, Sudan, Madagascar, Mauritania, Senegal, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia (Clements, 
et al, 2007; Schamljohn & Hooper, 2001; Swanepoel, & Coetzer, 1994; WHO, 2010).   
Outbreaks were confirmed in Yemen and Saudi Arabia in 2000; marking the first cases 
documented outside of Africa and raising concerns that it could extend into other parts of Asia 
and to Europe (Clements, et al, 2007; Ikegami & Makino, 2011; WHO, 2010).   
Since 1930, the virus has caused large outbreaks of disease in humans and livestock, 
these outbreaks were primarily confined to Africa until the first outbreak reported in Yemen and 
Saudi Arabia (Clements, et al, 2007; CDC, 2012; Musser, et al, 2006; Schamljohn & Hooper, 
2001).  This spread is believed to be the consequence of more abundant mosquito populations 
most likely due to flooding in the Asir Mountains (Hartley, et al, 2011; Musser, et al, 2006).   
Furthermore, the virus is potentially infectious by aerosol and can replicate in a wide range of 
mosquito species including Aedes mcintoshi, Aedes vexans, Culicoides sonorensis, as well as 
other Aedes, Culex, Eretmapoites, and Mansonia species (Fontenille, et al, 1998; Gaff, et al, 
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2007; Hartley, et al, 2011; Turell, et al, 2008).   Additionally, other vectors such as sand flies 
readily transmit RVFV (Fontenille, et al, 1998; Hartley, et al, 2011; Turell, et al, 2008).  The 
ability of the virus to be aerosolized increases the possibility of its use as a bioweapon (Ikegami 
& Makino, 2011; Hartley, et al, 2011; Mandell & Flick, 2011).  The recent spread of the virus 
outside of the African continent, demonstrates its ability to move northward to RVFV-free 
regions (Europe and Northern America) (CDC, 2012; Clements, et al, 2007; Musser, et al, 2006; 
Turell, et al, 2008).  These fears fuel the international demand for reliable and validated 
diagnostic tools for rapid diagnosis and control of RVFV (Clements, et al, 2007). 
 In 1931, Daubney and Hudson reported an outbreak of enzootic hepatitis in a herd of 
ewes which caused abortion and mortality on a farm in the Rift Valley near Lake Naivasha, 
Kenya, Africa (Flick & Bouloy, 2005; Ikegami & Makino, 2009; Musser, et al, 2006).  Though 
first isolated out of a lamb during the investigation in 1930, the virus was probably present in 
tropical Africa as early as the 1800s (Daubeny, et al, 1931).  The investigators observed a 
number of abortions in ruminants and the presence of a hyper-acute lethal infection, 
characterized by necrotic hepatitis in lambs and proposed the name Rift Valley fever for the 
disease (Easterday, et al, 1962; Easterday, et al, 1965; Hartley, et al, 2011; Ikegami & Makino, 
2009).   Pregnant ruminants infected with RVFV are subject to high rates of abortion, fetal 
malformations, and subclinical-to-fatal febrile illness (Bird, et al, 2009; Ikegami & Makino, 
2011). 
 
Etiology: Rift Valley Fever Virus 
 Rift Valley fever virus is an enveloped, single-stranded, negative, and ambisense RNA 
virus considered to be the cause of large zoonotic outbreaks of acute illness in humans and 
8 
 
livestock (Foster & Walker, 2002; Getsch & Bishop, 1979; Mullen & Durden, 2002; Murphy, et 
al, 1999; Turell, et al, 2008).  The virus is spherical, 80-120 nm in diameter, and is readily 
inactivated by lipid and acid solvents/conditions <6 pH (Bishop, et al, 1980; Gerdes, 2002; 
Gerdes, 2004).  Rift Valley fever virus is an antigenically distinct member of the family 
Bunyaviridae of the genus Phlebovirus and causes abortions and death (Clements, et al, 2007; 
Gerdes, 2002; Sindato, et al, 2011; Spickler & Roth, 2006).  It is a typical Bunyavirus with a 
tripartite, negative-stranded RNA, genome consisting of S-, M-, and L- segments each containing 
a separate nucleocapsid within the virion (Gerdes, 2002; Ikegami & Makino, 2009; Murphy, et 
al, 1999).  The nucleocapsids include the S-segment (1,000-3,000 nucleotides), which encodes N 
and NSs in an ambisense manner, the L-segment (6,500-12,000 nucleotides) that is responsible 
for the RNA dependent RNA polymerase gene, and the M-segment (3,600-4,900 nucleotides) 
which encodes the glycoproteins to make up the virus envelope (Figure 2.1) (Ikegami & Makino, 
2011; Gerdes, 2002; Gerdes, 2004).  This virus replicates in many cell types and antigen has 
been demonstrated in most areas of the spleen, liver, renal glomeruli, adrenocortical cells, and 
the walls of vessels (Gerdes, 2002; Gerdes, 2004; Van Der Lugt, et al, 1995).   
 
Figure 2-1: Morphology of Rift Valley fever virion adapted from Geisbert, et al, 2001 
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Diagnosis 
Due to the potential of RVFV to impact a wide geographic area, especially in areas where 
animal husbandry is extensive, the laboratory confirmation of the virus is treated as a diagnostic 
emergency (Archer, et al, 2011; Clements, et al, 2007; Murphy, et al, 1999).  Humans and 
animals of all ages and production systems can be impacted by this hemorrhagic fever 
(Clements, et al, 2007).  Diagnosis depends on virus detection of live virus or viral nucleic acids 
by real time polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) or isolation in mice or cell culture (Clements, 
et al, 2007; Murphy, et al, 1999; NICD, 2011).  Rift Valley fever virus has the ability to replicate 
in a variety of cell cultures (Murphy, et al, 1999; Spickler & Roth, 2006).  The general method 
for isolation of RVFV is either intracranial inoculation of suckling mice or infection of 
susceptible cell culture lines (Schamljohn & Hooper, 2001; Spickler & Roth, 2006).  Common 
cell cultures include Vero E6 (African green monkey) and BHK-21 (baby hamster kidney) cells 
(Ikegami & Makino, 2009; Murphy, et al, 1999).  Due to the rapid cytopathic nature of the virus, 
plaques form quickly in cell cultures and fatal infections in mice occur after intracranial 
challenge (Ikegami & Makino, 2009; Schamljohn & Hooper, 2001).  Thin section electron 
micrographs show the virus to have a typical overall morphology with predominantly spherical 
or ovoid particles of about 90 - 100 nm in diameter with surface fringe projections of about 6 - 
7.5 nm (Schamljohn & Hooper, 2001).  The virus is distinct when viewed by negative staining 
with sharply defined surface structures of small round morphologic units about 9.5 nm in 
diameter with a visible central hole (Martin, et al, 1985). 
The use of immunoassay methods are used to confirm the identity of isolates (Mohamed, 
et al, 2010; Murphy, et al, 1999).  Serologic diagnosis is done by IgM or IgG capture enzyme-
linked immunoassay (ELISA) on acute sera or by ELISA or hemagglutination inhibition (HAI) 
10 
 
assays on paired sera from surviving animals (Mohamed, et al, 2010; Murphy, et al, 1999; 
NICD, 2011).  In the absence of hemorrhages or specific organ manifestations, Rift Valley fever 
is clinically difficult to diagnose (Murphy, et al, 1999).  Rapid laboratory confirmation of cases 
is therefore essential for timely execution of supportive treatment, appropriate case management, 
infection control, and tracing of exposed contacts (Archer, et al, 2011; Mohamed, et al, 2010).   
Differential clinical diagnosis of RVFV varies depending on the region in question 
(Schamljohn & Hooper, 2001).  The disease should be suspected in: RVFV endemic regions 
following abnormally high precipitation, in outbreaks of increased rates of abortion in livestock, 
and in outbreaks of acute influenza-like illness in individuals with close contact with potentially 
infected livestock (Archer, et al, 2011; Schamljohn & Hooper, 2001; Spickler & Roth, 2006).  
Veterinarians, as well as field and laboratory workers, should use caution during postmortem 
examination of animals or while processing diagnostic materials in the laboratory in order to not 
become infected with the virus (Archer, et al, 2011; Murphy, et al, 1999; NICD, 2011).  Some 
researchers believe a human becomes infected primarily from contact with infected tissues of 
livestock or wild (game) animals, and less frequently from mosquito bites (NICD, 2011).   
Virologic diagnosis is usually quite simple given the high viremia present throughout the 
acute phase of illness and the ease of growth of the RVFV when inoculated intracranially into 
suckling mice or in susceptible cell cultures (Swanepoel, & Coetzer, 1994).  Serologic testing is 
also straightforward, particularly if paired sera (one taken acutely and the other 1-2 weeks later) 
are available (Mohamed, et al, 2010; Schamljohn & Hooper, 2001; Swanepoel, & Coetzer, 
1994).  IgM and IgG ELISA tests using inactivated RVFV infected cell lysates or slurries have 
shown to be highly beneficial in outbreak investigations (Morvan, et al, 1992; NICD, 2011; 
Woods, et al, 2002). 
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Transmission 
Rift Valley fever virus is transmitted to human hosts and livestock primarily by biting 
vectors – mosquitos, culicoides, and sand flies – and handling of infected animals by individuals 
(Archer, et al, 2011; Gerdes, 2002; Hartley, et al, 2011; Mullen & Durden, 2009; Sindato, et al, 
2011). This occurs through direct exposure to infected animals during slaughter or through 
veterinary and obstetric procedures (Abu-Elyazeed, et al, 1996; Archer, et al, 2011; CDC, 2012; 
Chambers & Swanepoel, 1980).  Additionally, aerosol transmission has occurred in the 
laboratory setting (CDC, 2012).  The disease caused by RVFV in humans is self-limiting and 
humans rarely die of infection; however, they may develop severe illness (Mullen & Durden, 
2002; Mullen & Durden, 2009).  No human-to-human transmission of RVFV has been 
documented (NICD, 2011).   
 In Africa, competent vectors include numerous mosquitoes including Aedes and Culex 
sp. which generally prefer to feed on livestock outdoors at night (Gerdes, 2002; Hartley, et al, 
2011; Ratovonjato, et al, 2011).  Vector competence studies conducted by Turell (2008), et al, 
have found competent vectors in both genera exist in the United States (U.S.).  In other countries, 
such as Madagascar, regional virological studies have been conducted to identify the mosquito 
species that could act as RVFV vectors (Ratovonjato, et al, 2011).   In Egypt, retrospective 
studies showed RVFV had not been enzootic before 1977 (Meegan, 1979).  Rift Valley fever 
virus activity disappeared after 1981 only to be reintroduced in 1993, which suggests that 
although there are mosquitos capable of acting as epizootic vectors (Culex sp.) existing in Egypt, 
mosquitos capable of RVFV transovarial transmission are probably lacking (Arthur, et al, 1993; 
Schamljohn & Hooper, 2001).  Researchers believe that RVFV was most likely introduced into 
Egypt from enzootic areas in Sudan (Meegan, 1981; Peters, 1997). 
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Outbreaks of RVFV tend to follow large rainfalls and climate variability in affected 
regions, which are associated with the periodic rise and fall of the disease (Davies, et al, 1985; 
Linthicum, et al, 1999; Sinato, et al, 2011).  The outbreaks occur at irregular intervals of years, 
some believe 8-10 years (NICD, 2011; Sinato, et al, 2011).  Following heavy rains breeding of 
the mosquito vector is favored and can recur over a succession of unduly wet seasons, which 
may not be seen for decades during drier spells (NICD, 2011; Sinato, et al, 2011; WHO, 2010).  
Researchers have documented a correlation between heavy rain and increased mosquito activity 
furthering the spread of the virus (Davies, et al, 1985; Linthicum, et al, 1999; NICD, 2011; 
Sinato, et al, 2011).  Post-excessive rainfall, mosquito eggs, usually of the genus Aedes and 
Culex sp., hatch (Davies, et al, 1985; Gerdes, 2002; Mondet, et al, 2005).   These mosquito eggs 
are transovarially infected with the RVFV and the resulting mosquitoes transfer the virus to their 
hosts (Ratovonjato, et al, 2011).   
Initially, all transmission is by mosquitos; however, viremic livestock can transmit 
directly and by aerosol to humans and other animals (NICD, 2011; Ratovonjato, et al, 2011).  
Once viremia is established in a host, additional species of mosquitoes can become infected and 
spread the disease (Musser, et al, 2006; Ratovonjato, et al, 2011).  Vertical transmission from 
infected female mosquitos to offspring is largely driving the RVFV outbreaks (Seufi & Galal, 
2010; Sinato, et al, 2011).  Observations in the field indicate RVFV is maintained vertically 
during dry periods in the eggs of Aedes sp. mosquitoes; however, this has not been observed in 
laboratory settings (Hartley, et al, 2011).  Mondet (2005), et al, documented Aedes spp. produced 
hardy eggs which remained viable in African soil for many years; therefore, if RVFV were 
introduced into the U.S., eradication would be extremely difficult (Hartley, et al, 2011; Musser, 
et al, 2006).  The reason the disease caused by RVFV has not spread more widely from Africa is 
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unknown because mosquitos capable of transmitting the virus exist in most parts of the world 
(Hartley, et al, 2011; Musser, et al, 2006; Turell, et al, 2008). 
 
Disease Cycle: Epidemiology 
Rift Valley fever virus is considered one of the most prolific viruses in the world 
(Hartley, et al, 2011; Sindato, et al, 2011).  It typically occurs as explosive epidemics of 
hemorrhagic disease in animals (Sindato, et al, 2011).  However, the ecology and epidemiology 
of Rift Valley fever virus is complex and poorly understood (Gaff, et al, 2007; Schamljohn & 
Hooper, 2001).  The infections in livestock are often recognized by the onset of abortion 
“storms” which sweep through livestock followed by acute febrile disease in humans 
(Schamljohn & Hooper, 2001).  Rift Valley fever virus is transmitted to human and livestock 
hosts primarily by arthopod vectors and handling of infected animals (Hartley, et al, 2011).  The 
virus enters via a mosquito bite, Aedes and Culex sp.  or through the respiratory system via 
aerosolization (Gerdes, 2002; Hartley, et al, 2011; Murphy, et al, 1999).  The virus enters its 
target tissues and replicates very quickly to high viremia (Gerdes, 2002; Gerdes, 2004; Murphy, 
et al, 1999).  The virus can affect many species including, cattle, sheep, goats, water buffalo, 
camels, monkeys, gray squirrels, and other rodents (Mullen & Durden, 2002).  However, cattle 
and sheep are considered the primary amplifying hosts (Sindato, et al, 2011).  During the 
incubation time, the virus invades the parenchyma of the liver and the reticuloendothelial organs, 
causing severe cytopathology often resulting in organ failure (Anderson, et al, 1987; Murphy, et 
al, 1999). 
At necropsy, it is not uncommon to find almost complete hepatocellular destruction 
(Gerdes, 2002; Murphy, et al, 1999).  Furthermore, spleen enlargement and hemorrhage is seen 
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in the gastrointestinal tract and the subserosal tissue (Gerdes, 2002; Murphy, et al, 1999).  
Evidence of encephalitis can be detected by the presence of neuronal necrosis and perivascular 
inflammatory infiltration seen in animals that survive the hepatic infection (Murphy, et al, 1999; 
Spickler & Roth, 2006).   In sheep, hepatic necrosis and hemorrhagic complications are the 
primary cause of death (Anderson, et al, 1987; Murphy, et al, 1999; Spickler & Roth, 2006). 
Survivors recover rapidly and maintain long lasting immunity (Hartley, et al, 2011; Murphy, et 
al, 1999).  In the laboratory setting, the virus infects a wide variety of laboratory and domestic 
animals and is often lethal to both.  Hepatitis and encephalitis syndromes are seen most 
commonly in these settings (Anderson, et al, 1987; Murphy, et al, 1999).  Viremia without 
severe disease can be seen in adult cats, dogs, horses, and some monkeys, while rabbits, pigs, 
guinea pigs, chickens and hedgehogs the most resistant (Daubney, et al, 1931; Easterday, 1965; 
Ikegami & Makino, 2011; Scott, 1963; Scott, et al, 1963; Spickler & Roth, 2006; Weiss, 1957; 
Walker, et al, 1970a; Walker, et al, 1970b).  Severe disease/mortality can occur in newborn 
puppies and kittens (Walker, et al, 1970a; Walker, et al, 1970b). 
 
Human Signs of Clinical Disease 
Similar to animals, the clinical signs of Rift Valley fever vary and may be asymptomatic 
(NICD, 2011; Sindato, et al, 2011).  The incubation period ranges from 2-6 days, but can be as 
short as 12 hours (Murphy, et al, 1999; Spickler & Roth, 2006).  Humans experience influenza-
like syndromes, hemorrhagic pyrexia (37.8-40ºC), strong headaches, body pain, dizziness, 
nausea, epigastric discomfort, photophobia-retinitis, anorexia, petechia, and hemorrhage from 
body cavities (Deutman & Klomp, 1981; Swanepoel & Coetzer, 2004; Sindato, et al, 2011; 
Spickler & Roth, 2006).   
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Additionally, blindness and encephalitis have been documented to occur in 1-2% of 
affected individuals with a case fatality risk of 10-20% (Otte, et al, 2004; Schamljohn & Hooper, 
2001; Sindato, et al, 2011; Swanepoel & Coetzer, 2004).  Asymptomatic infection or a relatively 
mild illness can be observed with pyrexia, chills, headache, “back breaking” myalgia, diarrhea, 
vomiting, hemorrhages, and hepatitis (Murphy, et al, 1999; Swanepoel & Coetzer, 2004; 
Sindato, et al, 2011).  Recovery from Rift Valley fever is considered to occur within 4-7 days 
(Murphy, et al, 1999; Spickler & Roth, 2006).  A small percentage of cases – less than two 
percent – can progress from illness to death; however, in patients with hemorrhagic disease 
fatalities are considered to reach 10% (Murphy, et al, 1999; Sindato, et al, 2011).  A small 
percentage of cases – less than one percent – can progress to meningoencephalitis with a 
subsequent extremely low case-fatality rate (Murphy, et al, 1999).  Other causes for these 
symptoms must be considered to facilitate timely treatments, prevention, and control for other 
infections including malaria, brucellosis, and Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever (Murphy, et al, 
1999; NICD, 2011; Sindato, et al, 2011). 
 
Animal Signs of Clinical Disease 
Clinical signs vary with age, species, and breed of animal and are most severe in young 
animals (Sindato, et al, 2011).  The incubation period is 12-36 hours in newborn lambs (who are 
most susceptible) and up to 72 hours in sheep, cattle, and dogs (Easterday, et al, 1962; Murphy, 
et al, 1999; Spickler & Roth, 2006).  Lambs experience pyrexia (40-42ºC), anorexia, 
lymphadenopathy, weakness, and usually death within 36 hours of inoculation (Mandell & Flick, 
2011; Murphy, et al, 1999; Sindato, et al, 2011).  It is not unusual to observe 90-100% mortality 
in affected animals (Mandell & Flick, 2011; Murphy, et al, 1999; Sindato, et al, 2011).  Adult 
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sheep also experience pyrexia (40-42ºC); however, mucopurulent nasal discharge, hemorrhagic, 
and/or foul-smelling diarrhea, jaundice, unsteady gait may also be observed; mortality is typical 
in 20-60% of adults (Sindato, et al, 2011; Spickler & Roth, 2006).  Abortion occurs in 90-100% 
of affect ewes (Mandell & Flick, 2011; Murphy, et al, 1999).  The disease is similar in goats but 
is considered milder in cattle (Murphy, et al, 1999).  Calves experience pyrexia (40-41ºC), 
anorexia, depression, and death within 36 hours of inoculation, and 10-70% mortality is observed 
in affected animals (Murphy, et al, 1999; Sindato, et al, 2011).  Adult cattle also experience 
pyrexia (40-41ºC); however, it is not uncommon to observe excessive salivation, anorexia, 
weakness, fetid diarrhea, and decrease in milk production (Mandell & Flick, 2011; Murphy, et 
al, 1999; Gerdes, 2002).  Like ewes, abortion in cattle is expected in 90-100% of dams (Mandell 
& Flick, 2011; Murphy, et al, 1999; Gerdes, 2002).  The mortality rate in adult animals is usually 
less than 10% (Murphy, et al, 1999; Sindato, et al, 2011).  Other causes for these clinical signs 
must be considered to facilitate timely treatments, prevention, and control for other infections 
including Bluetongue virus (BTV), Wesselsbron, ephemeral fever, enterotoxemia of sheep, ovine 
enzootic abortion, Campylobacter or Salmonella infection, brucellosis, vibriosis, trichomoniasis, 
Nairobi sheep disease, heartwater, or other causes of abortion (NICD, 2011; Sindato, et al, 2011; 
Spickler & Roth, 2006). 
 
Prevention, Control, and Treatment 
Immunization of livestock is considered to be the most effective way to prevent human 
Rift Valley fever cases and epizootic outbreaks (NICD, 2011; Schamljohn & Hooper, 2001; 
Spickler & Roth, 2006).  Currently there are no human or veterinary RVFV vaccines available 
commercially in the U.S. (Mandell & Flick, 2011; Hartley, et al, 2011).   Vaccines for veterinary 
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use are available in other countries, however, these may cause birth defects and abortion in sheep 
and induce only low-level protection in cattle (CDC, 2012; Schamljohn & Hooper, 2001).   
There are attenuated and killed vaccines produced in mice brains and embryonated eggs, which 
are considered effective and inexpensive, but are thought to cause abortion in pregnant ewes 
(Hartley, et al, 2011; Murphy, et al, 1999).   Killed vaccines, such as the Smithburn Attenuated 
vaccine, Clone 13 Attenuated vaccine, Onderstepoort Biological Products (major deletion in NSs 
gene that inhibits interferon), and the costly GALVmed Vaccine out of Kenya, confer lifelong 
immunity to vaccinated animals (Sindato, et al, 2011; CDC, 2012).  Inactivated vaccines, such as 
the formalin-inactivated wild-type virus used in Egypt and South Africa, produced in cell 
cultures avoid the problem of abortion, but are considered expensive and induce only short-lived 
immunity (El-Karamany, et al, 1981; Murphy, et al, 1999).   
Both live and attenuated of vaccines have been produced in large volumes in Africa 
(Murphy, et al, 1999).  The human live-attenuated MP-12 vaccine produced by Pfizer has shown 
promise in laboratory trials in domestic animals, but more research is needed before it can be 
used in the field (CDC, 2012; Ikegami & Makino, 2011; Morrill, et al, 1997; Schamljohn & 
Hooper, 2001).  Hunter (2002), et al, described pregnant ewes vaccinated with MP-12 at 28 to 56 
days of gestation either miscarried or produced teratogen lambs.  This is due to the antibodies 
evoked by MP-12 being identical to those produced in response to infection by full-strength 
RVFV (UTMB, 2012).  This response could also be an issue in the event of an outbreak, because 
public health officials would be unable to tell humans or animals vaccinated with MP-12 from 
naturally infected individuals, making it impossible to map the spread of an outbreak and 
respond effectively (CDC, 2012; Ikegami & Makino, 2011; UTMB, 2012). 
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Ideally, to be effective, the RVFV vaccine must be delivered in a systematic way to entire 
animal populations, preferably on a regular schedule, before the start of the mosquito season 
(Hunter, et al, 2002; Murphy, et al, 1999).  However, vaccination for RVFV is problematic 
because 1) viral movement can be so rapid that once an epidemic has been detected, it is difficult 
– if not impossible – to administer enough vaccine fast enough, 2) even when vaccine is 
delivered quickly, there is often not enough time for protective immunity to develop in the 
animals – need fourteen days minimum, and 3) control of this disease is expensive, ineffective, 
and very demanding in both human and monetary resources (Ikegami & Makino, 2011; Sindato, 
et al, 2011; Murphy, et al, 1999). Due to this cost, farmers and ranchers are resisting vaccination 
protocols in most areas of southern Africa (Murphy, et al, 1999).   
Other ways to mitigate the spread of RVFV involves control of the vector through 
widespread use of mosquito repellants in the human population to protect against their bites 
(Gerdes, 2002; Hartley, et al, 2011; NICD, 2011; Murphy, et al, 1999).  Use of larvacides at 
mosquito breeding sites are considered the most effective form of vector control as long as these 
sites can be clearly identified and are limited in size and extent (Hartley, et al, 2011; NICD, 
2011; Murphy, et al, 1999).  During periods of flooding, the number and extent of breeding sites 
may be too high for larvicide applications to be feasible (NICD, 2011).   Additionally, the 
interruption of the epizootic/epidemic transmission of RVFV would require the effective and 
wise use of mosquito adulticides to eliminate infected females when amplifying host animals are 
viremic (Hartley, et al, 2011).   Mosquito control is impossible in most areas of Africa due to the 
wide range of vector species with different habitats and econiche preferences, long breeding 
seasons in wide geographic areas (Murphy, et al, 1999).   These variables contribute to large 
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mosquito populations resulting in widespread epidemics (Gerdes, 2002; Gerdes, 2004; Murphy, 
et al, 1999).   
Epidemics usually are limited in duration to 3 to 4 months, but may persist in wetter areas 
for 1 to 3 years (Gerdes, 2002; Gerdes, 2004; NICD, 2011).  It is important to identify which 
species are competent vectors in the natural transmission cycle because control measures vary 
(Gargan, et al, 1988; Turell, et al, 2008).  Close monitoring and surveillance of vectors is 
essential for control of the Rift Valley fever infection in animal and human populations (CDC, 
2012; Mandell & Flick, 2011; NICD, 2011). 
There is no current medical treatment available for humans infected with RVFV; often 
only supportive care is available (NICD, 2011; Schamljohn & Hooper, 2001).  Some researchers 
believe the antiviral drug ribavirin may be of some benefit in the treatment of RVFV, although 
the human efficacy data is considered to be lacking (Peters, et al, 1986; Schamljohn & Hooper, 
2001).  However, NICD (2011) does not recommend ribavirin or corticosteroids for the 
treatment of RVFV.   
Early dialysis for patients with renal failure is considered to improve outcome (NICD, 
2011; Schamljohn & Hooper, 2001).   Isolation or barrier nursing is not necessary with suspected 
individuals; however, theoretical risk of transmission is considered possible (Mandell & Flick, 
2011; NICD, 2011).  Standard precautions should be implemented to avoid contact with infected 
blood and tissues (Hartley, et al, 2011; Mandell & Flick, 2011; NICD, 2011).  Additionally, the 
treatment of nosocomial (hospital) infections should be considered and treated promptly 
(Hartley, et al, 2011; NICD, 2011).  Sanitation and vector controls should be attempted when 
dealing with RVFV, but often do not control the spread of disease (NICD, 2011; Spickler & 
Roth, 2006).  Rift Valley fever virus is inactivated by ether, chloroform, strong solutions of 
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sodium or calcium hypochlorite (chlorine should exceed 5000 ppm), low pH (<6.8), and 
detergents that break up the virus (Spickler & Roth, 2006).  It is recommended that carcasses of 
previously infected animals be buried or burned (Murphy, et al, 1999; Spickler & Roth, 2006).  
Workers at risk for exposure should wear personal protective equipment (PPE) to avoid contact 
with potentially infectious materials and aerosols (Hartley, et al, 2011; Murphy, et al, 1999; 
Schamljohn & Hooper, 2001). 
In 2011, a group at the Department of Agricultural Economics at Texas A&M University 
conducted an economic assessment of the U.S. agricultural and human vulnerability and 
consequence of a RVFV epidemic outbreak (Hughes-Fraire, et al, 2011).  Because a Rift Valley 
fever outbreak has never been seen in the U.S. the economic model is based on previously seen 
diseases, including WNV, and models previously conducted by Hartley, et al (2009) and Gaff, et 
al (2007) (Hughes-Fraire, et al, 2011).  An integrated epidemic/economic model to examine the 
extent of RVFV spread in the Southeast Texas Livestock population indicated a potential loss to 
the U.S. of $120 million – $2.3 billion with combined livestock and human national costs 
(Hughes-Fraire, et al, 2011).  This estimated cost includes healthcare, control, surveillance, and 
animal product losses (Hartley, et al, 2009; Hughes-Fraire, et al, 2011).  The reported cost shows 
the economic damages of an outbreak in the first year to be approximately three times greater in 
the livestock population compared to the human population (Hughes-Fraire, et al, 2011).  
However, Hughes-Fraire, et al (2011) believes the cost estimates of both the human and 
livestock populations are likely underestimated.  Future research should be conducted to follow 
up the report because additional variables were not included, such as the domestic damages of 
decreased beef demand due to food safety concerns and trade bans, all susceptible livestock 
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(goats and swine), as well as the impact of damages to society and tourism, in an endemic 
country (Hartley, et al, 2009; Hughes-Fraire, et al, 2011; Mandell & Flick, 2011). 
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Chapter 3 - Occupational Biosafety  
Introduction 
Biosafety is the consistent application of safety measures to minimize or prevent 
exposure to the agent handler, lab and building occupants, the community, and the environment 
(CDC, 2009b; Harding & Byers, 2006; Lord, et al, 1999; Pedrosa & Cardoso, 2011; Singh, 
2009).   Biosafety is often achieved through good microbiological work practices, safety and 
containment equipment, and facility design consideration (CDC, 2009b; Harding & Byers, 
2006).  Another common term in the laboratory is biosecurity. Biosecurity and biosafety are 
related concepts and are sometimes confused with each other (CDC, 2009b). However, 
biosecurity prevents the loss, theft or misuse of microorganisms, biological materials, and 
research related information through limiting access to facilities and research materials and 
information (CDC, 2009b; Pedrosa & Cardoso, 2011). 
Biosafety applications are applied in many types of laboratories and are commonly used 
in research involving human and animal pathogens, select agents (bioterrorism), toxins of 
biological origin, rDNA research, human gene transfer, plants, and animals, shipping, transport, 
import, export, permits, training, infection control, shipping, BSL-3, and work practices, and 
lastly in field work/work abroad (feral animal, insects, and arthropods) (Baron & Miller, 2008; 
CDC, 2009b; Harding & Byers, 2006; Ikegami & Makino, 2011; Singh, 2009).  Often, a 
breakdown in biosafety procedures is the result of a breakdown in good microbiological work 
practices (Baron & Miller, 2008; Pike, 1979).  This breakdown in microbiological practices has 
been identified by epidemiologists to be the cause of 90% of laboratory acquired infections 
(LAI) (Baron & Miller, 2008; CDC, 2009b; Harding & Byers, 2006; Kruse, et al, 1991). 
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In the last 150 years, laboratory workers have occasionally become infected by the 
microorganisms they were working with and some of these cases have resulted in fatalities 
(CDC, 2009b; Pike, 1979; Singh, 2009).  Only a small number of LAIs involve a specific 
incident, a majority of them involve non-specific associates such as being in a laboratory 
working with agents (Harding & Byers, 2000; Harding & Byers, 2006).  Attempts have been 
made to define the extent of the problem, determine the cause of the accidental infections, and to 
devise safe equipment and procedures to prevent them (Harding & Byers, 2006; Pedrosa & 
Cardoso, 2011; Pike, 1979; Singh, 2009).  This safety equipment includes the use of mechanical 
pipettors which were first used as early as 1907 to prevent LAI (Reinhardt, 1918).  The use of a 
protective microbiological cabinet was first reported in Germany in 1919 (Fricke, 1919; Phillips, 
1961).   In contrast, the use of protective microbiological cabinets in the U.S. was not seen until 
the 1940s when they began to be used at the National Institutes of Health (NIH), Naval 
Biological Laboratory (NBL), and Fort Detrick (Kruse, et al, 1991; Phillips, 1961).  Today there 
are several classes (I-III) of safety cabinets with various features to allow safe handling and 
bench work with aerosol containment (Kruse, et al, 1991; Miller, 2008; Wedum, et al, 1957; 
Wedum, 1963; Wedum, 1997).  Additionally, personal protective equipment (PPE) involving 
gloves, laboratory coats, and safety glasses/shields are now commonly used in all laboratories 
(CDC, 2009b; Wedum, 1963).   
When discussing occupational biosafety for the laboratory worker, the recognition of the 
risks and dangers of pathogens causing accidental infection is important (Kruse, 1991; Pedrosa & 
Cardoso, 2011; Singh, 2009; Sulkin & Pike, 1951).  Efforts to secure and maintain pure cultures 
of infectious agents has been around for quite some time, but it was not until laboratory acquired 
infections (LAI) appeared that any attention was given to the protection of the worker and 
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surrounding personnel (CDC, 2009b; Kruse, et al, 1991).  The risk of LAIs has been associated 
with the isolation, identification, collection, and research of pathogenic agents (Kruse, et al, 
1991; Phillips & Bailey, 1965; Singh, 2009).  This risk has also been associated with 
transmission hazards, such as mouth pipettes, syringes and needles, spills and splashes, bites of 
animals or ectoparasites, as well as aerosolization, which have been recognized and reported 
since the late 1800’s (Kruse, et al, 1991; Phillips & Bailey, 1965; Wedum, 1963).   Laboratory-
acquired infections represent an occupational hazard unique to laboratory workers, especially 
those in the microbiology laboratory (Pedrosa & Cardoso, 2011; Singh, 2009).  Exposures can 
occur inadvertently, or may be due to lapse in technique leading to accidental inoculation 
(Pedrosa & Cardoso, 2011; Pike, 1979; Singh, 2009).  Fortunately, not every exposure results in 
LAI (Hanson, et al, 1967; Pedrosa & Cardoso, 2011; Pike, 1979; Singh, 2009).  Nevertheless, the 
detection of hazardous risks while working with biological agents has shaped the implication of 
safety equipment, laboratory design, and laboratory protocols and procedures (CDC, 2009b; 
Lord, et al, 1999; Singh, 2009; Sulkin & Pike, 1951; Phillips & Bailey, 1965).   
Procedures and regulations for biological laboratories first were established in the 1950’s, 
with biosafety levels being established later.  In 1956 West Germany had published regulations 
for laboratories that 1) prohibited mouth pipetting, and 2) forbid food, drink, tobacco, and 
chewing gum in the laboratory setting, both of which are still regulations in place today (Phillips, 
1961; Wedum, 1997).  Currently, it is highly recommended laboratory workers be vigilant when 
working with infectious agents should be especially attentive to hazardous procedures including 
making slides, inoculating biochemical agents, working with infected animal tissue suspensions 
and arboviruses, other bloodborne pathogens, using a centrifuge, and anything that capable of 
generating an aerosol (Beekmann & Henderson, 2005; Hanson, et al, 1967; Miller, 2008; 
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Pedrosa & Cardoso, 2011; Pike, 1979; Wedum, 1963).  It is also common practice for 
laboratories to have standard operating procedures (SOP), use biological safety cabinets (BSC), 
vaccinate workers in high risk situations, and have established procedures with medical response 
plans for each agent (Miller, 2008; Pedrosa & Cardoso, 2011; Pike, 1979).   
 
Brief History of Biosafety 
It is believed that even though scientific application of disinfectants, sterilants, and 
preservatives contributing to biosafety are limited to the past 150 years, empirical practices go 
back to ancient times (Block, 2001; Pike, 1979; Singh, 2009).  Seymour Block, an 
Environmental Microbiologist, is credited with researching the historic use of disinfectants or 
infection control (Block, 2001).  He cites that one of the oldest recordings of decontamination 
was Homer’s account of the use of sulfur to gas decontaminate a home in his novel The Odyssey 
(Block, 2001).  When Odysseus returned home and killed his wife’s suitors, he says to his nurse 
“bring me some disinfectant sulfur and make me a fire so I can fumigate the house” (Block, 
2001; Rieu, 1952).   Block (2011) also states that The Bible contains references for infection 
control, waste control, decontamination and patient isolation and that Aristotle advised 
Alexander the Great to boil water and bury excrement (Kruse, et al, 1991). 
One of the founding principles of biosafety today is credited to Susruta, a Hindu 
physician more than 1500 years ago, who stated “disinfect surfaces or equipment before and 
after use” (Block, 2001).  The Black Plague, Yersinia pestis, in the Middle Ages brought forth 
several applications of protective measures and devices, even though the people at the time did 
not understand the full conceptual pathology of the disease process (Block, 2001; CDC, 2009b).  
Preventive measures included burning victims’ clothing, burning bodies, and using unique 
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personal protective equipment (PPE) worn by physicians (Block, 2001; CDC, 2009b).  In 1438, 
the Venice Magistry of Health held cargo and mail from ships out at sea at a “safe distance from 
port” until they could gas decontaminate items before they were brought to the main land (Block, 
2001).  Today, organizations that protect the U.S. from agricultural and ecological damage, 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Animal Plant Health Inspection Service 
(APHIS), use similar measures to quarantine and inspect materials before they are brought in to 
the country (Block, 2001).  Other individuals such as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis Pasteur, 
Joseph Lister, and Robert Koch have made significant contributions to biosafety and the 
preservation of public health (Block, 2001; CDC, 2009b; Ikegami & Makino, 2011; Kruse, et al, 
1991). 
 
Laboratory-Acquired Infections 
The first recognized laboratory acquired infections (LAI) with biological agents were 
reported in the late 1880’s (CDC, 2009b).  Biological agents such as brucellosis (1887), glanders, 
diphtheria, cholera, tetanus (1893), and Typhoid fever (1885) were known to be the cause of 
accidental laboratory infections (CDC, 2009b; Chosewood & Wilson, 2009; Kruse, et al, 1991; 
Pike, 1979; Wedum, et al, 1957).  The epidemiological review of LAIs had a slow start; thirty 
years after the first reported LAI Typhoid fever infection, the first survey was made of laboratory 
infections (Kisskalt, 1915; Kruse, et al, 1991; Wedum, 1997).  In 1915, Kisskalt published the 
first report from Germany listing cases of laboratory acquired Typhoid fever infections (Kisskalt, 
1915; Kruse, et al, 1991; Pike, 1979).  Interestingly, the first analyzed report of accidental 
laboratory acquired viral infection was published in 1935 (Francis & Magill, 1935; Pedrosa & 
Cardoso, 2011; Pike, 1979).  This was also the first recorded case of Rift Valley Fever in the 
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Western hemisphere (Francis & Magill, 1935; Pedrosa & Cardoso, 2011; Pike, 1979; 
Schwentker & Rivers, 1934).   In 1947 there was an outbreak of Q fever (caused by the 
rickettsial, Coxiella burnetii) affecting 47 people at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
(Huebner, 1947; Pike, 1969; Wedum, et al, 1957).    
There are many case reports of LAIs in the literature; however, few studies have 
indicated the magnitude of the problem as it relates to the occupational health of laboratory 
workers (Sulkin & Pike, 1951; Pike, 1979; Wedum, et al, 1957).   Before the 1950’s, little 
consideration had been given to the need for adequate protection of personnel who came into 
daily contact with disease producing agents (Sulkin & Pike, 1951; Pike, 1979).  In 1951, Sulkin 
& Pike summarized 1,342 infections, and 39 fatalities caused by a variety of disease producing 
agents that presumably were acquired as a result of laboratory work in the U.S. during 1930-
1950 (Sulkin & Pike, 1951).  A large proportion of the infections occurred among professional 
and technical workers, research assistants, and graduate students, including medical and 
veterinary students, animal caretakers, janitors, and dishwashers (Sulkin & Pike, 1951; Pike, 
1976; Pike, 1979; Wedum, et al, 1957).  Many variables make it virtually impossible to define 
risk of infection to laboratory personnel handling infectious material (Pike, 1979).  However, 
researchers believe the number of recorded and documented infections that have occurred with 
various agents in laboratory settings may be the best indicator of risk (CDC, 2009a; Pike, 1976; 
Pike, 1979). 
Pike and Sulkin, conducted a series of surveys during the middle of the 20th century 
which went to 4,000 laboratories of various types and received an approximate 50% response 
(Byers, 2009; Harding & Byers, 2006; CDC, 2009a; Pike, 1979; Pike & Sulkin, 1965).  The 
surveys illustrated that 4,079 LAIs, due to 159 agents, were reported from 1935-1978; Fourteen 
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percent of these reports were from clinical laboratories and 168 of the cases resulted in fatalities 
(Byers, 2009; Harding & Byers, 2006; CDC, 2009a; Pike & Sulkin, 1965; Pike, 1976; Pike, 
1978; Pike, 1979; Sulkin & Pike, 1951).  Pike and Sulkin believed 4,079 cases was a lower limit, 
because it is likely not all infections were reported (Byers, 2009; Harding & Byers, 2006). 
Harding and Byers conducted a literature survey of LAIs from 1979-2005 which 
indicated that 1,141 LAI with 24 fatalities were reported; 5 of these deaths were fetal deaths 
aborted as a consequence of maternal LAIs (Byers, 2009; Harding & Byers, 2000; Harding & 
Byers, 2006; Phillips, 2011).  The findings of Harding and Byers indicated that 45% and 51% of 
clinical and research laboratories, respectively, accounted for the total LAIs reported (Byers, 
2009; CDC, 2009a; Harding & Byers, 2000; Harding & Byers, 2006).  This is considered 
significantly different from Pike and Sulkins findings prior to 1979 which indicated that 17% and 
59% of clinical and research laboratories accounted for the total LAIs reported (CDC, 2009a; 
Hanson, et al, 1967; Sulkin & Pike, 1951) 
It is believed the reports by Sulkin and Pike in the 1950s contributed to the decisions in 
the U.S. to modernize laboratories so they may more safely handle infectious agents (Phillips, 
1961; Wedum, 1997).  Many individuals have reported known infections, but the numbers do not 
include the many subclinical infections which likely occurred (Baron & Miller, 2008; Pike, 
1979).   These infections are impossible to calculate but some believe they may outnumber the 
clinically apparent diseases (Baron & Miller, 2008; Pike, 1979).  The accurate quantification of 
risks associated with working in a biological laboratory is difficult to assess (Singh, 2009).  Due 
to a lack of information on the actual numbers of infections and the population truly at risk, it is 
difficult to determine the true incidence of LAIs with any certainty (CDC, 2009a; Pedrosa & 
Cardoso, 2011).  Fortunately, the recent Harding and Byers data indicates recent LAIs are 
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considered to be decreasing (Harding & Byers, 2006; Pedrosa & Cardoso, 2011; Phillips, 2011).  
This decrease is attributed to improvements in containment equipment, engineering controls, 
designation of biosafety levels (see below) and greater emphasis on safety training (see 
Appendix A) and equipment protocols (see Chapter 5) (Pedrosa & Cardoso, 2011; Phillips, 
2011). 
It is worth noting that aside from individuals becoming ill from poor biological safety, a 
research laboratory could lose its funding, especially federal funding (Phillips, 2011).  An 
example of this was seen in 2007 when the CDC suspended Texas A&M’s research on infectious 
diseases after the university failed to report two 2006 cases of human exposure to biological 
agents (Phillips, 2011).  This example, as well as the aforementioned information, is a great 
reason why biosafety as well as occupational and public health are important in a laboratory 
setting. 
 
Biosafety Levels 
A biosafety level is the level of bio-containment precautions required to isolate dangerous 
biological agents in enclosed facilities.  Bio-containment is classified by the danger to the 
surrounding environment as biological safety levels (BSL) (CDC, 2009b; Chosewood &Wilson, 
2009; OSHA, 2006).  The levels of containment range from the lowest biosafety level 1(BSL-1) 
to the highest at level 4 (BSL-4), with higher numbers indicating a greater risk to the external 
environment (Chosewood &Wilson, 2009).  In the United States (U.S.), the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) specified these levels in 1984 via the CDC/NIH Biosafety in 
Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL) handbook (Chosewood &Wilson, 2009). 
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Biosafety Level (BSL-1) 
This is the lowest level of bio-containment, where the containment zone may be only a 
chemical fume hood (OSHA, 2006).  This level is considered suitable for work involving well-
characterized agents not known to consistently cause disease in healthy adult humans and of no 
known or of minimal potential hazard to laboratory personnel and the environment (CDC, 
2009b; OSHA, 2006).  Work is performed with well-defined and characterized strains of viable 
organisms not known to cause disease in healthy individuals (OSHA, 2006).  There are some 
agents in this level which are “opportunistic” and can cause disease in compromised individuals 
(OSHA, 2006).  These laboratories are not necessarily separate from the general traffic patterns 
in a building (CDC, 2009b).   Work is generally performed on open bench tops using standard 
microbiological practices (CDC, 2009b; OSHA, 2006).   Special containment equipment and 
devices of facility design are not usually required, but can be adjusted based on appropriate risk 
assessment (CDC, 2009; OSHA, 2006).  Laboratory personnel should have specific laboratory 
training in the procedures to be conducted in the laboratory and are supervised by personnel with 
general training in microbiology or related fields (CDC, 2009b; OSHA, 2006). 
Biosafety Level (BSL-2) 
This is the next level of bio-containment and builds upon the precautions of agent 
practices of BSL-1(CDC, 2009b; OSHA, 2006).   BSL-2 laboratory practices and procedures are 
suitable to work with agents that pose moderate risk to personnel and the environment (CDC, 
2009b; Lord, et al, 1999; OSHA, 2006).  The access to the laboratory is limited when work with 
these organisms is being conducted (CDC, 2009b; OSHA, 2006).   Biological safety cabinets 
(BSC) or protective equipment is recommended for procedures which involve infectious aerosols 
or splashes (CDC, 2009b; Kruse, et al, 1991; Lord, et al, 1999; OSHA, 2006).  Laboratory 
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personnel must have specific training in handling pathogenic agents, be familiar with hazards 
associated with the specific agents used, and be directed by scientists competent in handling 
infectious agents as well as familiar with good microbiological practices (CDC, 2009b; OSHA, 
2006; Riley, et al, 1999). 
Biosafety Level (BSL-3) 
This level of bio-containment is applicable to clinical, diagnostic, teaching, research, or 
production facilities where work is conducted with dangerous or exotic agents and the potential 
for infection is real and may cause serious or potentially lethal disease through inhalation (CDC, 
2009b; OSHA, 2006).   Precautions for work with agents at this level require BSL-1 and BSL-2 
practices plus work is performed in special containment facilities (OSHA, 2006; Riley, et al, 
1999).   Access to a BSL-3 laboratory is strictly limited to only individuals performing work 
(CDC, 2009b; OSHA, 2006).  Laboratory personnel must have specialized training in handling 
pathogenic and potentially lethal agents and must be supervised by scientists competent in 
handling infectious agents (CDC, 2009b; OSHA, 2006; Riley, et al, 1999).  All work involving 
the manipulation of infectious materials must be conducted within BSCs or other physical 
containment devices (CDC, 2009b; Riley, et al, 1999).   Often a BSL-3 laboratory has special 
engineering and design features such as airlock entrance zones, sealed floors and wall 
penetrations, and directional airflow (negative pressure to the surrounding areas) to aid 
containment (CDC, 2009b; OSHA, 2006). 
Biosafety Level (BSL-4) 
This is the highest level of bio-containment (maximum containment), where the 
containment involves isolation of the organism by means of building systems, sealed rooms; with 
complex ventilation requirements, sealed containers, positive pressure personnel suits, and 
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procedures for entering and exiting the room (CDC, 2009b; OSHA, 2006).  This level of 
containment requires practices and procedures for work with dangerous and exotic agents that 
pose a high individual risk of aerosol-transmitted laboratory infections and life-threatening 
disease (CDC, 2009b; OSHA, 2006).   Frequently, the at-risk diseases may be fatal or be diseases 
where there are no available vaccines or treatments, or be due to a related agent with unknown 
risk of transmission (CDC, 2009b; OSHA, 2006).  Agents with a related antigenic connection to 
agents requiring BSL-4 containment must be handled at this level until appropriate data is 
obtained to continue work at this level or to re-designate to another level (CDC, 2009b).   
Precautions for use of these agents include BSL-1, BSL-2, and BSL-3 practices plus specialized 
procedures for BSL-4 (CDC, 2009b; OSHA, 2006).   
Laboratory workers must have specific and thorough training with strict adherence to 
appropriate specialized practices and procedures in handling extremely hazardous infectious 
agents (OSHA, 2006).  Laboratory staff is trained in primary and secondary containment 
functions of standard and specialized practices and have shown to be proficient in the use of the 
agents at this level (CDC, 2009b; OSHA, 2006).   High levels of security, in accordance with 
institutional policies, are used to obtain access to the facility to help assure only authorized 
personnel may be admitted to any area within the containment zone (CDC, 2009b).    
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Laboratory Biosafety Level Criteria 
offers a great review and explanation of Standard Microbiological Practices (SMP), Special 
Practices, Laboratory Facilities (Secondary Barriers), and Safety Equipment (Primary Barriers 
and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)) for each level of biosafety. 
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Chapter 4 - Field Experience 
Student Learning Objectives 
The learning objectives for the field experience included: Learning about the zoonotic 
disease Rift Valley Fever at the United Stated Department of Agriculture (USDA) Arthropod-
Borne Animal Disease Research Unit (ABADRU) and working and gathering an understanding 
of procedures involved with zoonotic disease research and its application to a real world setting.  
Additional objectives included participation in occupational hazard guidelines and laboratory 
biosafety recommendations associated with agents in a BSL-2 laboratory.  Comprehension was 
demonstrated via constructed educational presentations for future laboratory worker training 
(Appendix A & B). 
 
Brief History of Organization 
In 1862, President Abraham Lincoln signed into law the Agricultural Act, which 
established the USDA (USDA, 2012).  This year marks the 150th anniversary of the USDA 
(USDA, 2012).  During its time, the USDA has seen the Hatch Act of 1887, which provided 
funding for agricultural experimental stations in each state and the Smith-Lever Act of 1914, 
which funded cooperative extension services in each state to teach agriculture and related 
subjects to the general public (USDA, 2012).  Additionally, the formation of the USDA has led 
to many provisions and units designed to meet the needs of farmers and ranchers, assure food 
safety, promote agricultural trade and production, protect natural resources, and foster 
communities for the general public (USDA, 2012).   
One such unit is the Arthropod-Borne Animal Disease Research Unit (ABADRU), in 
Manhattan, Kansas, which is part of the Agricultural Research Service (ARS) and considered to 
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be the largest agricultural research organization in the world (USDA ARS, 2010a).  Agricultural 
Research Service (ARS) is the principal scientific research agency of the USDA (USDA ARS, 
2010a).  The ABADRU recently relocated to Manhattan, Kansas from Laramie, Wyoming to 
enable researchers to work collaboratively with Kansas State University (KSU) researchers at the 
Biosecurity Research Institute (BRI) (USDA ARS, 2010a).  The ABADRU studies animal – 
diseases transmitted by arthropods – primarily biting midges and mosquitoes.   Furthermore, the 
ABADRU develops diagnostic tools, vaccines, and other technologies to protect human and 
animal health (USDA ARS, 2010a).  Researchers study the molecular biology of these diseases, 
the insects that spread them, the epidemiology of these diseases, and how the disease affects 
humans and animals (USDA ARS, 2010a).  Diseases of particular interest include exotic and 
domestic strains of Bluetongue virus (BTV), Vesicular Stomatitis virus (VSV), and Epizootic 
Hemorrhagic Disease virus (EHDV), as well as wild type and vaccine strains of Rift Valley fever 
virus (RVFV) (USDA ARS, 2010a). The mission of the ABADRU is to solve major endemic, 
emerging, and exotic arthropod-borne disease problems in U.S. livestock (USDA ARS, 2010a). 
 The ABADRU is housed in the Center for Grain and Animal Health Research 
(CGAHR), in Manhattan, Kansas just off the K-State University campus.  The Center for Grain 
and Animal Health Research was established in 1919 and is the only USDA research laboratory 
in Kansas (USDA ARS, 2010b).  The Center for Grain and Animal Health Research (CGAHR) 
is made up of five research units (USDA ARS, 2010b): The Engineering and Wind Erosion 
Research Unit (EWERU); which develops technology to measure and reduce wind erosion, the 
Grain Quality & Structure Research Unit (GQSRU) that investigates relationships between 
physical and chemical attributes and end-use quality for various products and develops rapid and 
precise predictive tests; the Hard Winter Wheat Genetics Research Unit (HWWGRU) which 
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finds and provides new genetic material to address hard winter wheat problems including insect 
pests, diseases and abiotic stresses; and, finally, the Stored Product Insect Research Unit 
(SPIRU), which develops new knowledge and methods for controlling insect pests in grain and 
food products (USDA ARS, 2010b). 
 
Student Activities 
A great deal of time was devoted to learning and creating educational materials to ensure 
laboratory biosafety. This was achieved through comprehension of the occupational risks and 
hazards associated with working in a BSL-2 laboratory, and the desired knowledge senior 
researchers want their workers to know.  Each USDA worker needs to complete a series of 
tutorials prior to beginning work in any position at the CGAHR facility.  These presentations 
covered general overviews of safety, use of personal protective equipment (PPE), after hour-
laboratory use, and chemical hygiene.  None of these presentations were specific to working in a 
BSL-2 laboratory, which is the type of laboratory in which the ABADRU conducts its research.  
Additionally, there was no presentation specifying the types of viral agents the unit works with.  
Both of these types of tutorials were deemed necessary for the unit.   Dr Scott McVey and the 
CGAHR’s safety officer, JoAnne Gresens, believed these would be beneficial, especially to 
student or temporary workers who may not have a biological background. 
Through literature research of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the 
USDA’s compiled safety information, and the completion of PubMed searches, I was able to put 
together a PowerPoint presentation for new workers.  Also, while working in the laboratory with 
senior researchers and laboratory technicians, I accumulated a list of important facts workers 
wished they would have been told prior to working in a laboratory and those things they would 
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like future workers to know in order to provide a safe and efficient work environment.  This 
PowerPoint is designed specifically for the ABADRU laboratories and can be viewed with 
presenter’s notes in Appendix A.   
The presentation is a much needed educational tool and is designed to provide needed 
safety information as well as to provide a knowledge base for future workers to build on and 
utilize in order to be proactive during their training period in the laboratories.  The biosafety 
presentation is designed to be viewed by an individual or a classroom of new employees.  At the 
completion of the presentation, the participant(s) will take the accompanying quiz.  Pending a 
score of 80% or better, the participant will receive a certificate of completion for their employee 
training records.   
While working at the ABADRU, I learned about the zoonotic agent Rift Valley fever 
virus and the current research being conducted to help protect the health of both humans and 
animals alike (Chapters 1 & 2).  This information was obtained through review of published 
literature, discussions with ABADRU staff, and presentations attended.  During discussions with 
my mentors, it was decided an additional educational PowerPoint presentation providing an 
undergrad biology level overview of the two most commonly researched viruses at ABADRU, 
Bluetongue virus and Rift Valley fever virus, would also be a useful tool for new employees.  
The idea is to give employees with limited biology or virology background a basic understanding 
of what the viruses are and why the ABADRU’s research on them is important.   Additionally, it 
was thought if workers have a better understanding of the research being conducted, they may 
feel more a part of the unit and its success.  Also, participants could then have a clear 
understanding of the health impact and risks associated with working with these viruses, thereby 
instilling a self-vigilance that would increase the safety and decrease possible health risks to 
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themselves and others in the laboratories.  This educational PowerPoint presentation was 
constructed through the utilization of literature review, textbooks, ABADRU staff, and current 
publications.  It can also be viewed with presenter’s notes in Appendix B.   By finishing the 
accompanying quiz, a certificate of completion will be added to each individual’s employee 
records. 
During the course of the field experience at the ABADRU, I was able to participate and 
observe in a series of research projects in one of the BSL-2 laboratories.  Through these projects, 
I was able to see and experience laboratory protocols and procedures.  Many of the projects 
involved mice and were focused on different strains of Culicoides sonorensis, which are raised at 
the CGHAR facility and utilize the mice for blood meals.  The purpose of these projects were to 
gauge the immunologic response of the mice from the feedings by collecting blood, bone 
marrow, lymph tissue, spleens, and the skin from the feeding sites.  These collected samples later 
underwent ELISA to detect the cells and antibodies produced as a response to the feeding.  
Throughout the course of these projects, I observed the study process and considered methods or 
procedures in the laboratory which could be addressed in order to decrease occupational hazards 
associated with infectious and zoonotic agents.  These observations can be found in Appendix C. 
In the late spring of 2012, the ABADRU received a P50 Microdose NeedleFree Injection 
System© to incorporate into their tool box.  It was hypothesized that this device, or one like it, 
can be used to administer modified live vaccines (such as MP-12) or the live Rift Valley fever 
virus in a controlled research facility.  The idea was that the device would benefit the ABADRU 
in three ways: 1) Increase worker safety by reducing the risk of accidental needle sticks from 
traditional needle and syringe administration, 2) Reduce the need to raise and maintain 
Culicoides sonorensis (midge) strains for research, and 3) Possibly improve the immunologic 
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response from vaccines.   This thought process was sound, considering the risk of laboratory 
acquired infections (LAI) is always a concern when working with infectious (blood borne) 
materials and agents (Chapter 3).  The use of a needle-free device may decrease unnecessary 
exposures in a biological laboratory.   Additionally, the literature has demonstrated that the use 
of devices like the P50 Microdose NeedleFree Injection System© improves the immunologic 
response of some vaccines when given transdermally.  This is believed to occur because of the 
antigen-presenting cells that can be found in this location.  Moreover, this has also been shown to 
occur with smaller doses of vaccine antigen.  Lastly, midges bite into the epidermis and 
superficial dermis to receive a blood meal and in so doing transmit virus; needle-free injection 
systems may be able to simulate the transmission method of these arthropod vectors. 
Despite the hypothetical benefits, the safety of using such a device needs to be addressed 
with the goal of keeping the risk of LAIs low, especially if they can be avoided.  Hence, another 
project was conducted during my field experience involving preliminary assessment of the 
biosafety of needle-free intradermal delivery of zoonotic vaccines and agents.  One of the main 
concerns of using a needle-free device was the production of an aerosol or a splatter that could 
cause unwanted exposures to both administrator and animal.  Therefore, Dr Mark Ruder, Dr 
McVey, and I collaborated to construct a project to evaluate the needle-free device’s safety and 
set baseline data for future comparative evaluations at the ABADRU (see Chapter 5 for study 
report). While working with the ABADRU, I had an opportunity to participate in a field trip to 
the United States-Mexico Border Port of Entry (USPOE) in Santa Teresa, New Mexico with the 
Frontier program.  The Frontier program is a joint program with Kansas State University (KSU) 
and New Mexico State University (NMSU), which includes interdisciplinary research for the 
historical studies of border security and trade policy.  The trip involved students and 
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professionals from KSU, NMSU, Georgia Tech University, Minnesota, and companies such as 
Cargill.  To give an overview of the trip, we first met with Dr Jason Ackleson to discuss the 
occurrence of border control interdiction and trade security.  We then attended a round table 
discussion at the Immigration Policy and Human Rights: Perspective from Border Communities 
Conference in the Corbett Student Union, NMSU.   
Following this session, we caravanned to the USPOE at Santa Teresa, New Mexico and 
met with the New Mexico Border Authority, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (USCBP), and 
a Food and Drug Administration (FDA) inspector.  With these individuals, we discussed 
inspection of pedestrian traffic and commercial/non-commercial traffic.  Additionally we 
discussed how freight trucks are selected, inspected, processed, and the protocol for 
passing/failing trucks in attempt to safe guard the U.S. Agriculture system as well as U.S. public 
health.  We then met with the Division Director of New Mexico Department of Agriculture, at 
the Chihuahua Regional Cattle Union Livestock Facilities and discussed the logistics and 
procedures the USDA veterinarian and staff conducts to inspect and certify health of livestock, 
mainly cattle, wanting to be brought into the U.S. This trip underlined the real life activities, 
issues, and actions, which occur on a daily basis to protect and defend this nation’s public health 
and food supply.   More complete details of this trip are summarized in Appendix C. 
All in all, this field experience resulted in numerous personal and academic gains.  I was 
able to utilize knowledge gained from previously related classes.  I gained exposure and 
understanding of the risks and hazards of zoonotic disease research, especially as it relates to 
attenuated Rift Valley fever virus (MP-12) in a Biosafety Level (BSL)-2 Research Facility.   I 
achieved a working understanding of disciplines that directly protect public and animal health.  
Finally, I was able to achieve an understanding of the type of procedures that should be in place 
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to protect occupational biosafety and public health as well as decrease hazards to workers in the 
laboratory and research setting through practical application and my border experience. This was 
an invaluable experience and has deepened my views on the importance of public health and 
veterinary medicine. 
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Chapter 5 - Preliminary Assessment of Biosafety for Needle-free 
Intradermal Delivery of Zoonotic Vaccines and Agents 
C.J.  Roof MS, M.  Ruder DVM PhD, D.S.  McVey DVM PhD DCVM 
 
Abstract 
This preliminary trial was designed to evaluate the biosafety for the P50 Microdose 
NeedleFree Injection System©.   The purpose was to assess occupational biosafety and hazards 
to the administrator for the use of Rift Valley fever virus vaccine in a bioresearch laboratory.  
The assessment was conducted through the subjective use of visual analogue scales, overall 
impressions of pooling and aerosolization and the objective measurements of wetness, and 
surface splatters at the injection site.  The objective of this study was to characterize potential 
risks to the user of the P50 Microdose NeedleFree Injection System© for intradermal injection of 
infectious agents or modified live vaccines in biosafety level (BSL) 2 and BSL-3 laboratories at 
the Arthropod-Borne Animal Disease Research Unit (ABADRU) as well as to evaluate 
differences in surface splatter and wetness for the test dose and pressure combinations. 
 
Introduction 
Occupational biosafety is an important consideration for laboratory workers and 
veterinarians working in bioresearch laboratories in general, but increased caution needs to be 
used when working with zoonotic agents (CDC, 2009; Singh, 2009; Sulkin & Pike, 1951).  
Vigilant safety is needed during handling, storage, and management of these agents in the 
laboratory setting (Miller, 2008; Pedrosa & Cardoso, 2011; Pike, 1979).  Agents commonly 
studied at the Arthropod-Borne Animal Disease Research Unit (ABADRU) include domestic and 
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exotic strains of Bluetongue virus (BTV), Epizootic Hemorrhagic Disease virus (EHDV), 
Vesicular Stomatitis virus (VSV), and wild type and vaccine strains of the zoonotic Rift Valley 
fever virus (RVFV) (USDA, 2010).  All of these viruses have an arthropod vector that transmits 
the virus during the blood feeding from mammals (CDC, 2009; Mullen & Durden, 2009).   
Traditional arthropod research involves the raising and rearing of insect vectors for study 
purposes (CDC, 2009).  This can be tedious and encompass unique containment challenges for 
researchers (CDC, 2009).  Nevertheless, it is considered a necessary process because the 
arthropod vectors feed in a way that allows transmission of the virus and elicits an immunologic 
response by the host (NICD, 2011).  For example, midges bite into the epidermis and superficial 
dermis to receive a blood meal and in so doing transmit virus (CDC, 2009; NICD, 2011).  
Recently, it has been hypothesized that the use of needle-free injection systems may be able to 
simulate the transmission method of arthropod vectors.  If effective, this would allow research to 
be conducted without the need of arthropods.  Furthermore, it would allow the delivery of 
vaccinations in a manner similar to infection method.  It has already been established that needle-
free intradermal administration of modified live vaccines elicits an appropriate immunologic 
response (Chen & Payne, 2002; Lambert & Laurent, 2008).   
Vaccinations are typically given via injection of a vaccine formulation using a needle and 
syringe (Deng, et al, 2012).  The skin is considered a sensitive immune organ and has been 
determined to be a practical site of vaccination due to antigen-presenting cells present at the 
dermis and epidermis (Chen & Payne, 2002; Lambert & Laurent, 2008).  These data suggests 
that intradermal or transdermal delivery of vaccines, rather than standard intramuscular (IM) or 
subcutaneous (SQ) administration, may be more efficient and induce protective immune 
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responses with smaller amounts of vaccine antigen (Chen & Payne, 2002; Lambert & Laurent, 
2008).   
Unfortunately, intradermal injections using needle and syringe are technically 
challenging and safety concerns do exist (Deng, et al, 2012).  Additionally, multiple injection 
sites are often required because the injection site volume is limited due to the strain on the cells 
at the site (Chen & Payne, 2002).  There is also the risk of depositing more of the agent in the 
various non-target layers of dermis or the possibility of bypassing the dermis and injecting 
subcutaneously (Chen & Payne, 2002).  These variables may impact consistency in delivery, 
resulting in variation in the host's immunological response to the administered agent.   
Needle-based systems always present the risk of accidently puncturing the administrator 
or assistant at the time of administration (Miller, & Pisani, 1999; Mitragotri, 2005; Ekwueme, et 
al, 2002).   This poses a risk of directly injecting human workers with a modified live agent or 
blood-borne pathogens, which represents a major occupational health concern (Deng, et al, 2011; 
Ekwueme, et al, 2002).  An alternative to the traditional needle and syringe that has been 
considered safer and possibly more efficient are needle-free devices, which delivers solutions 
with CO2 pressure (Clements, et al, 2008; Deng, et al, 2011).  This type of device is gaining 
popularity in the swine industry for its ease of use, effective delivery, and desired immunologic 
response (Chase, et al, 2008).  Additionally, the device allows for the agent to be distributed 
through the dermal layer triggering a more efficient immunologic response in animals (Chase, et 
al, 2008; Ekwueme, et al, 2002).   
Human medicine, there is a push to transition to needle-free devices in order to reduce the 
direct health-care and societal costs resulting from needlestick injuries, although the financial 
benefit is difficult to quantify (Miller, & Pisani, 1999; Ekwueme, et al, 2002).  It is estimated 
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that there are more than 1.3 million human deaths that occur globally and a $535 million loss 
annually due to current unsafe injection practices (Miller, & Pisani, 1999).  Devices for needle-
free techniques to deliver agents and vaccines are continually being developed (Mitragotri, 
2005).   As the market for needle-free delivery systems increases, it is highly likely more and 
more devices will be made available. 
Other researchers have used skin models to evaluate cosmetic treatments, wound healing, 
and the evaluation of needle-free transcutaneous delivery of drugs and vaccines in both humans 
and animals (Schramm, et al, 2004; Deng, et al, 2012).  Real animal skin likely provides the best 
model when evaluating the occupational risk associated with using needle-free administration of 
vaccines and agents in the field and in the laboratory.  Needle-free devices may be a safer 
alternative to the needle and syringe in the research trials of BTV, EHDV, VSV, and RVFV.   
These devices may be well-suited to deliver vaccines or potentially live agents during 
experimental infections (Zehrung, & Kristensen, 2009).   Still, there are risks when working with 
these agents: One concern is the aerosolization of the agent at time of administration (Zehrung, 
& Kristensen, 2009).   
It is documented that humans can become infected with RVFV by mosquito bite or more 
commonly, by contact with virus contaminated blood or through inhalation of virus in aerosols 
originating from infected livestock (Mullen & Durden, 2002; Mullen & Durden, 2009).  There 
have been reports of laboratory-acquired infection (LAI) cases of Rift Valley fever contracted 
through aerosols (Francis & Magill, 1935; Pedrosa & Cardoso, 2011; Pike, 1979; Schwentker & 
Rivers, 1934; Strauss & Strauss, 2008).  Moreover, some researchers have suggested that the risk 
of aerosol generation by intradermal needle-free delivery devices needs to be examined 
(Zehrung, & Kristensen, 2009).  It is possible devices with needles might be more appropriate for 
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vaccines than alternative methods, which generate an aerosol (Clements, et al, 2008; Zehrung, & 
Kristensen, 2009).  The primary objective of this study was to characterize potential risks to the 
user of the P50 Microdose NeedleFree Injection System© for intradermal injection of infectious 
agents or modified live vaccines in biosafety level (BSL) 2 and BSL-3 laboratories at the 
Arthropod-Borne Animal Disease Research Unit (ABADRU).  An additional objective was to 
evaluate differences in surface splatter and wetness for the test dose and pressure combinations. 
 
Materials and Methods 
In this study, donated Boer goat’s (Capra hircus) forelimbs with hide intact were 
received from the Animal Research Services (ARS) at Kansas State University (KSU).  Limbs 
were stored in a sealed bag at -20ºC.  They were thawed at room temperature less than 24 hours 
prior to use.  Hair was shaved at the injection sites hair clippers (#40 blade).  The P50 Microdose 
NeedleFree Injection System©1 uses compressed C02 as a power source (Figure 5.1).  Adjustable 
dose settings for the P50 Microdose include 0.1-0.5 ml via a standardized 0.27 mm orifice with 
the ability to deliver transdermal to intramuscular injections based on the size of the animal, 
according to the manufacturer.   
In order to determine the effectiveness of dose administration, we utilized two easily 
visualized compounds, a 5% Crystal Violet dye solution and a Germ Juice® solution (a 
fluorescent dye visualized with a black light).   These solutions were drawn up in to 10 mL Luer-
lock syringes to be attached to device.  Doses and pressures for this preliminary evaluation were 
50 µL/100 psi, 100 µL/90 psi, and 250 µL/90 psi for each respective combination.  These 
dose/pressure combinations were based on early data in which various dose/pressure 
                                                 
1 Pulse NeedleFree Systems, Inc.  8210 Marshal Drive, Lenexa, KS.  66214 
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combinations were tested on flank skin form the same goat hide.  These combinations were 
chosen because higher pressures tested at these same selected doses resulted in intramuscular 
injections and when dose volumes were increased splatter was see at all tested pressures.  The 
device was primed by connecting a10 mL syring of the respective solution to the device.  Next, 
the trigger was pulled, with the device’s orifice being pressed into the open rubber stopper of a 
500 mL Pyrex glass bottle, until a consistent stream was seen.  Injection sites were marked on 
the goat limbs with a fine tipped marker to allow visualization of the injection site as well as to 
signify the appropriate marker for measuring observed wetness and surface splatter.  The tip of 
the injection device was wiped with a paper towel in between injections to ensure no carry over 
wetness/ solution from the previous injection.  To administer a dose, the device was held 
perpendicular to the skin with the trigger pulled and then pressed firmly against the skin (this 
ensured the same pressure for delivery of dose) (Figure 5.2).   
Post injection, the sites were photographed.  Next, any observed wetness or surface 
splatter was measured in millimeters (mm).  Sites were observed for pooling and noted if 
aerosolization was seen during the injection.  In half of the injections, a construction paper cone, 
white for the Crystal Violet and black for the Germ Juice® solutions [Figure 5.3] was modified 
to fit around the device.  This was done in an attempt to collect and allow visualization of 
droplets that resulted from the delivery of the solution for each dose/pressure combination.  Any 
droplets visualized indicated an affirmative for aerosolization.  After initial data was collected, a 
#20 scalpel blade was used to cut into the injection site (marked site) at random to visually 
observe if the dye penetrated the dermis or further.  A picture of the dissected site was taken.  
These steps were repeated for each of the 6 injection sites per dose/psi combination per limb.  An 
additional comparison was conducted during this trial using a traditional intradermal syringe and 
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the 5% Crystal Violet solution.  The syringe was used to administer six intradermal injections to 
objectively observe any difference between the methods.  The injection sites were also dissected 
and photographed.  The limbs were disposed via biohazard bags and taken to an incinerator at 
the Diagnostic Laboratory at Kansas State University (KSU).  The work area was cleaned using 
70% ethanol, paper towels, and Clorox wipes.  The device was disassembled and cleaned with 
70% ethanol to ensure complete cleaning.   
Data for statistical analysis were entered in to Microsoft Excel, 2010.  Means for the 
wetness and surface splatter measurements were calculated.  The pooling and aerosolization data 
was ordinal and percentages were calculated for each, respectively. 
 
Results 
Results for the assessment of the P50 Microdose NeedleFree Injection System© with the 
Germ Juice® solution can be seen in Table 5.1.  A mean wetness diameter of 23.2 mm was 
observed for the 50 µL/100 psi combination (Table 5.2).  The presence of pooling was observed 
0.0% of the time at this dose pressure combination.  Surface splatter provided a mean radius of 
16.7 mm (Table 5.2).  The visualization of aerosolization was seen only 33.3% of the time.  For 
the 100 µL/ 90 psi combination, a mean wetness diameter of 27.2 mm was observed (Table 5.2).  
Pooling was seen 66.7% of the time.  The presence of surface splatter was seen at a mean radius 
of 24 mm (Table 5.2).  Aerosolization was seen 100% of the time at this dose/pressure 
combination.  The 250 µL/90 psi combination provided a mean wetness diameter of 38.5 mm.  
The presence of pooling was seen 83.3% of the time.   The mean surface splatter observed at this 
combination provided a mean radius of 22.7 mm, which is lower compared to the 100 µL/90 psi 
combination; however, the droplets observed on the cone during the measurement of 
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aerosolization for the 250 µL were much larger than the 100 µL dose (Table 5.2).   The 
aerosolization for the 250 µL dose was also 100%.  The wetness and surface splatter 
measurements can be seen for each dose/pressure combination in Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5.  
Additionally, the pooling and aerosolization results can be seen for each dose/pressure 
combination in Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7. 
Table 5.1 summarizes the results for the assessment of the injection device with the 
Crystal Violet.  The 50 µL/100 psi provided a mean wetness diameter of 25.5 mm (Table 5.2).   
The presence of pooling was seen 50.0% of the time at this dose/pressure combination, while the 
mean surface splatter radius was measured at 0.0 mm (Table 5.2).  The aerosolization was 
observed 0.0% of the time at this dose.  The 100 µL/90 psi combination demonstrated a mean 
wetness diameter of 25.8 mm.  The pooling increased to 83.3% of the time.  Surface splatter 
increased considerably from the first dose/pressure combination and provided a mean radius of 
19.3 mm (Table 5.2).  Aerosolization also increased considerable and was seen 100% of the time 
at this combination.  At the 250 µL/90 psi dose combination, a mean wetness diameter of 45.5 
mm was seen; almost double the previous dose (Table 5.2).  The observed pooling decreased 
slightly and was seen at 66.7% of the time.  Like with the Germ Juice® solution, the surface 
splatter at the 250 µL/90 psi combination provided a decreased mean radius splatter of 14.7 mm, 
when compared to the lesser dose (Table 5.2).  Additionally, aerosolization was also observed 
100% of the time, with greater droplet seen on the cone compared to the less dose of 100 µL 
(Figure 5.8).  The wetness and surface splatter results can be seen for each dose/pressure 
combination in Figure 5.9 and Figure 5.10.  And the pooling and aerosolization results can be 
seen for each dose/pressure combination in Figure 5.11 and Figure 5.12. 
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Discussion 
With advances in technology, it is important to evaluate the use and safety of devices as 
well as consider their use in practical and safe applications.  The present investigation was 
conducted to subjectively and objectively characterize potential risks to the user of the P50 
Microdose NeedleFree Injection System© for intradermal injection of infectious agents or 
modified live vaccines in a BSL-2 laboratory.   The devices has been successfully used for 
subcutaneous and intramuscular injections in livestock in many clinical and laboratory settings.  
Intradermal or transdermal applications are of interest for research purposes. 
The ability of the device to produce surface splatter, wetness, pooling, and an aerosol 
during administration of an injection is evident in these results (Figures 5.8, 5.13, & 5.14).  There 
was wetness and pooling of injection solution regardless of dose/pressure combination seen in 
this project (Figures 5.15 & 5.16).  During the study trial, there was observed droplet formation 
on most of the cones when used, the tip of the injection device, and the skin adjacent to the 
injection site (Table 5.1 and Figures 5.7 & 5.12).   The wetness and pooling indicates that either 
the entire dose did not get delivered at the pressure setting used, meaning a high pressure should 
be used, or that there was a “leaking” of the solution out through the injection site, which 
questions the accuracy of delivering a specific dose (Figure 5.13).  Some of the injection sites 
increased the diameter of the wetness even minutes post injection, making the “leaking” 
hypothesis likely.  It is doubtful the pressure should have been higher in this study due to the 
observed subcutaneous and submuscularis delivery seen with some of the injection sites.  There 
are other groups that claim their human devices have low visible moisture at the injection site 
with little to no visible flow (Gutierrez, et al, 2009). 
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For a direct injection site comparison during the trial, a traditional intradermal syringe 
was used.  As can be seen in Figure 5.17, the injection sites were much smaller with no surface 
splatter, wetness, or aerosolization; however, a small amount of pooling was seen at removal of 
the needle.  Additionally, on dissection a small bleb in the transdermal space was observed with 
no evidence of subcutaneous delivery (Figure 5.18).  In the original protocol, depth of injection 
was going to be another data point; however, during the study it became evident depth 
measurements grossly could not be done with any consistency.  It is possible a histological 
review of the injection site post injection may offer a more consistent and useful means of 
measuring depth and spread in the dermal layers. 
The Germ Juice® solution offered a unique visualization during injection.  A UV light 
allowed for fine surface splatter to be observed, which was not seen with the 5% Crystal Violet 
solution, especially at the 50 µL/100 psi injection sites (Figures 5.19 & 5.20). The low number of 
data points and the questionable normal distribution of the data for the injection dose/pressure 
combinations indicate that more data points should have been acquired.  
The needle-free injection device produces a high pressure, high speed, narrow stream of a 
liquid that penetrates the skin (Chase, 2008; Giudice, 2006).  This results in transdermal, 
sometimes subcutaneous (SQ) to intramuscular (IM), penetration of the injected solution.  As can 
be seen in Figures 5.21 and 5.22, there is clear evidence of transdermal delivery of Crystal Violet 
solution in this study.  However, the use of the single orifice to deliver the injection solution begs 
the question: what if the use of a multi-orficed tip provided a more uniform intradermal 
distribution of solution without SQ or IM penetration. 
It is possible that the use of dead and previous frozen tissue could have impacted the 
results seen here.  The moisture content and tissue response was different from that of live, fresh 
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tissue.  These variables could have increased or possibly decreased the amount of droplets and 
wetness observed.  Therefore, it is recommended that future research be conducted on fresh or 
live tissues for better evaluation.  Additionally, other devices as well as pressure and dose 
combinations should also be evaluated for their safety use and possible application in research 
settings.   
Needle-free technology offers the benefits of fast injections compared with conventional 
needles and no needle disposal issues (Vishnu, et al, 2012; Zehrung & Kristensen, 2009).  Due to 
data in this project, it is obvious there is a biosafety risk to the administrator when using this 
device as available for intradermal delivery of modified live vaccines or live zoonotic agents, 
such as Rift Valley fever virus (MP-12).  At this point, it is difficult to precisely quantify the risk 
with certainty, but further method development should be conducted before this device is used 
for Rift Valley fever virus, even in a BSL-3 Ag laboratory. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Germ Juice® Solution 
Limb Location Right Front Data Points Mean 
Wetness (mm) 50 uL/100 psi 22 21 19 23* 27* 27* 23.2 
Pooling (y/n)  50 uL/100 psi 0 0 0 0* 0* 0* 0.0% 
Surface splatter (mm)  50 uL/100 psi 19 0 14 20* 22* 25* 16.7 
Aerosolization (y/n)  50 uL/100 psi . . . 0* 0* 1* 33.3% 
Wetness (mm) 100 uL/90 psi 27 33 25 22* 28* 28* 27.2 
Pooling (y/n)  100 uL/90 psi 1 0 1 1* 0* 1* 66.7% 
Surface splatter (mm)  100 uL/90 psi 25 20 20 26* 24* 29* 24.0 
Aerosolization (y/n)  100 uL/90 psi . . . 1* 1* 1* 100.0% 
Wetness (mm) 250 uL/90 psi 35 33 35 36* 40* 52* 38.5 
Pooling (y/n)  250 uL/90 psi 1 0 1 1* 1* 1* 83.3% 
Surface splatter (mm)  250 uL/90 psi 0 0 70 35* 31* 0* 22.7 
Aerosolization (y/n)  250 uL/90 psi . . . 1* 1* 1* 100.0% 
Crystal Violet Solution 
Limb Location Left Front Data Points Mean 
Wetness (mm) 50 uL/100 psi 25 21 22 34* 25* 26* 25.5 
Pooling (y/n)  50 uL/100 psi 0 1 0 1* 1* 0* 50.0% 
Surface splatter (mm)  50 uL/100 psi 0 0 0 0* 0* 0* 0.0 
Aerosolization (y/n)  50 uL/100 psi . . . 0* 0* 0* 0.0% 
Wetness (mm) 100 uL/90 psi 30 22 25 28* 24* 26* 26 
Pooling (y/n)  100 uL/90 psi 0 1 1 1* 1* 1* 100.0% 
Surface splatter (mm)  100 uL/90 psi 0 30 20 25* 20* 21* 25.8 
Aerosolization (y/n)  100 uL/90 psi . . . 1* 1* 1* 83.3% 
Wetness (mm) 250 uL/90 psi 43 53 63 35* 28* 51* 45.5 
Pooling (y/n)  250 uL/90 psi 1 0 1 1* 0* 1* 66.7% 
Surface splatter (mm)  250 uL/90 psi 0 0 0 27* 24* 37* 14.7 
Aerosolization (y/n)  250 uL/90 psi . . . 1* 1* 1* 100.0% 
*indicates cone use 
Table 5-1: Intradermal P50 Device Evaluation of Germ Juice® and Crystal Violet solution 
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Germ Juice® Solution 
Wetness x 
50 µL 23.2 
100 µL 27.2 
250 µL 38.5 
Splatter x 
50 µL 16.7 
100 µL 24 
250 µL 22.7 
Crystal Violet Solution 
Wetness x 
50 µL 25.5 
100 µL 25.8 
250 µL 45.5 
Splatter x 
50 µL 0.0 
100 µL 19.3 
250 µL 14.7 
  
Table 5-2: Means for the measured wetness and surface splatter for each dosing for both 
Germ Juice® and Crystal Violet 
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Figure 5-1: P50 Intradermal needle-free device with CO2 system 
 
 
Figure 5-2: P50 Intradermal needle-free device being used to inject solution 
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Figure 5-3: Cone attached to P50 Intradermal needle-free device 
 
 
Figure 5-4: Graph illustrating the wetness observed for each dose/pressure combination for 
the Germ Juice® solution 
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Figure 5-5: Graph illustrating the surface splatter for each dose/pressure combination for 
the Germ Juice® solution 
 
 
Figure 5-6: Graph demonstrating the observed pooling for each dose/pressure combination 
for the Germ Juice® solution 
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Figure 5-7: Graph demonstrating the aerosolization for each dose/pressure combination for 
the Germ Juice® solution (*indicates only three injections were evaluated) 
 
 
Figure 5-8: Photographed cone during aerosolization observation at 250 µL/90 psi 
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Figure 5-9: Graph illustrating the wetness observed for each dose/pressure combination for 
the Crystal Violet solution 
 
 
Figure 5-10: Graph illustrating the surface splatter for each dose/pressure combination for 
the Crystal Violet solution 
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Figure 5-11: Graph demonstrating the observed pooling for each dose/pressure 
combination for the Crystal Violet 
 
 
Figure 5-12: Graph demonstrating the aerosolization for each dose/pressure combination 
for the Crystal Violet solution (*indicates only three injections were evaluated) 
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Figure 5-13: Demonstration of wetness and surface splatter post 100 µL injection of Crystal 
Violet 
 
 
Figure 5-14: Demonstration of residue due to spray and aerosolization of Crystal Violet 
solution 
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Figure 5-15: Completed series of 50 µL injections of Crystal Violet 
 
 
Figure 5-16: Completed injection series for Crystal Violet limb (similar pattern was 
conducted for Germ Juice® limb) 
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Figure 5-17: Example of traditional syringe and needle conducting six injections 
 
 
Figure 5-18: Dissected injection sites for traditional needle and syringe 
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Figure 5-19: 50 µL injection of Crystal Violet 
 
 
Figure 5-20: Surface splatter of a 50 µL injection with Germ Juice® 
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Figure 5-21: Dissected injection site for 100 µL injection of Crystal Violet 
 
 
Figure 5-22: Dissected injection site for 50 µL injection of Crystal Violet demonstrating 
transdermal penetration 
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Appendix A – Arthropod-Borne Animal Disease Research Unit: 
BSL-2 Laboratory Biosafety Training Module 
Slide 1 Arthropod-Borne Animal Diseases 
Research Unit: BSL-2 Laboratory 
Biosafety
Training Module
USDA, ARS, Arthropod-Borne Animal Diseases 
Research Unit (ABADRU)
Center for Grain and Animal Health Research 
(CGAHR) Manhattan, KS
Prepared by Clinton Roof, MS
 
Hello and welcome to the Arthropod-
Borne Animal Diseases Research Unit: 
BSL-2 Laboratory Biosafety Training 
Module here at the USDA Center for 
Grain and Animal Health Research 
(CGHAR). 
 
 
Slide 2 
Objectives
 Describe biosafety levels and 
biohazardous materials
 Identify the principles of biosafety
 Identify safety equipment
 Personal and laboratory
 Describe laboratory standards and 
practices
 To keep you safe and help us reach our 
common goal
 
The objectives of this presentation are 
to describe biosafety levels, and 
biohazardous materials, identify the 
principles of biosafety, identify safety 
equipment both personal and laboratory, 
and to describe laboratory standards and 
practices; to keep you safe and help us 
reach our common goal. 
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Slide 3 
General Biosafety
 Who needs this training?
All individuals who work with or have 
access to biohazardous materials!
 
I am sure you are asking yourself who 
needs this training? 
 
And the answer is all individuals who 
work with or have access to 
biohazardous materials!! In other 
words, you. 
 
 
Slide 4 
Biosafety Levels (BSL)
 BSL-1: Student training/teaching labs
 Agents are well-defined and characterized
 Not known to cause disease
 BSL-2: Clinical/diagnostic labs
 Agents are considered moderate-risk agents
 Associated with human  disease (varying severity)
 Open bench
 Standard microbiological techniques
 Probability of splashes and aerosols is low
 
Let’s begin with a brief introduction to 
biosafety levels or BSLs…. 
 
BSL-1 laboratories are designed for 
student educational training and 
teaching labs.  They are also used for 
working with well-defined and 
characterized agents not known to cause 
disease in normal healthy adults.  
 
BSL-2 laboratories are designed for 
clinical, diagnostic purposes, and 
teaching laboratories working with 
indigenous moderate-risk agents present 
in the community and associated with 
human disease of varying severity.  
Work is conducted on an open bench 
with standard microbiological 
techniques, providing that the 
probability for splashes and aerosols is 
low. Lab personnel have specific 
training in handling pathogenic agents 
and are supervised by scientists 
competent in working with infectious 
agents and associated procedures. 
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Slide 5 
Biosafety Levels (BSL)
 BSL-1: Student training/teaching labs
 Agents are well-defined and characterized
 Not known to cause disease
 BSL-2: Clinical/diagnostic labs
 Agents are considered moderate-risk agents
 Associated with human  disease (varying severity)
 Open bench
 Standard microbiological techniques
 Probability of splashes and aerosols is low
 
Here at CGAHR we use BSL-1 and 
BSL-2 agents and this presentation will 
follow the standards set for those levels. 
We will focus on BSL-2 standards 
because BSL-2 builds on the protocols 
and standards set by BSL-1. However, 
to give you a big picture of the different 
biosafety levels we are going to define 
the BSL-3 and BSL-4. 
 
 
Slide 6 
Biosafety Levels (BSL) 
 BSL-3: Research/production facilities
 Agents may be indigenous or exotic
 Associated with serious and potentially lethal 
infections
 Potential for respiratory transmission
 High transmissibility by aerosols
 BSL-4:Dangerous/exotic laboratories
 Agents pose high individual risk of life-
threatening disease
 Vaccine or therapy may not be available
 
BSL-3 laboratories are designed for 
clinical, teaching, research, or 
production facilities that work with 
indigenous or exotic agents, which may 
cause serious illness or potentially lethal 
infection. These agents may have the 
potential for respiratory transmission. 
 
BSL-4 laboratories are designed for 
working with dangerous and exotic 
agents.  These agents pose a high 
individual risk of life-threatening 
disease which may be transmitted via 
aerosol route and there is no available 
vaccine or therapy if there is accidental 
exposure. 
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Slide 7 
Principles of Biosafety
 Fundamental objective:
 Biological agent containment
 Purpose of the containment
 Reduce/eliminate exposure
 Laboratory & building personnel 
 Environment
 Protect people from dangerous pathogens
 
The fundamental objective of biosafety 
is to provide containment of potentially 
harmful biological agents. The purpose 
of containment is to reduce or eliminate 
exposure of laboratory personnel, other 
persons, as well as the outside 
environment.  
 
 
Slide 8 
Laboratory Practices
 Strict adherence
 Standard microbiological practices and 
techniques
 Laboratory biosafety manual
 READ this manual prior to working
 Workers need to be…
 Aware of potential hazards 
 Appropriately trained
 Proficient in safe practices & techniques
 
The laboratory biosafety manual is 
developed specifically for each 
independent laboratory in this facility.  
It identifies specific hazards in the 
laboratory, biosafety policies, and site 
specific standard operating procedures.  
The manual also identifies specific 
practices and procedures to minimize or 
eliminate these hazards. 
 
All personnel in the laboratory are 
required to read the biosafety manual.  
Each person in the laboratory is 
responsible for the work being 
conducted in the laboratory.  He/she 
should be trained and knowledgeable in 
specific techniques, safety procedures, 
and associated hazards. If ever you are 
uncertain, ask your supervising 
researcher. 
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Slide 9 
Standard Operating Procedures
 Microbiological practices
 Safe pipetting techniques
 Procedures for handling sharps
 Decontamination protocols
 Primary equipment barriers
 Biological safety cabinet
 Containment methods for 
safe centrifugation
 Equipment certification
 
Standard operating procedures or SOP 
includes the principal content of 
biosafety manuals. SOPs for 
microbiological practices include: safe 
pipetting techniques, procedures for 
handling sharps, and decontamination 
protocols.  Standard operating 
procedures for use of primary 
equipment barriers include: working in 
a biological safety cabinet, containment 
methods for safe centrifugation, and 
procedures for equipment certification. 
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Laboratory Safety Standards
 Perform all procedures to minimize 
splashes and aerosols
 Avoid working alone or after hours
 Do NOT engage in “horseplay”
 Avoid using cell phone in laboratory
 
Some laboratory safety standards to 
keep in mind while working in 
ABADRU laboratories include 
preforming all procedures in a manner 
to minimize splashes and aerosols. 
Additionally, avoid working alone or 
after hours in the laboratory.  To aid in 
the prevention of accidents do not 
engage in horseplay. Lastly, for the sake 
of your attention span and the safety of 
those around you avoid using your cell 
phone in the lab this will reduce the risk 
of contamination and carelessness.  
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Common Sources of Exposure
 Accidental inoculation by needle/syringe
 Cuts/abrasions
 Contaminated items & animal bites
 Inhalation of aerosols via work/accident
 Contact
 Mucous membrane and contaminated surfaces
 hands on surfaces
 Oral ingestion
 Inhalation/accident
 
Some common sources of exposure in a 
BSL-2 laboratory include accidental 
inoculation by needle/syringe, cuts or 
abrasions through contaminated items 
or animal bites, inhalation of aerosols 
via work/accident, contact with mucous 
membrane and contaminated surface (ie 
hands or surfaces), oral ingestion and 
lastly through inhalation or accidental 
ingestion. 
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Slide 12 
Safety Equipment
 Biological safety cabinet (BSC)
 Containment of hazardous 
splashes, splatters, and/or 
aerosols
 Aerosols may be produced via
 Pipetting, centrifuging, grinding, shaking, 
mixing, opening containers, harvesting 
infected tissues
 
Safety equipment for all biosafety levels 
include biological safety cabinets or 
BSC, as well as enclosed containers, 
and engineering controls to minimize 
exposure to hazardous biological 
materials.  The biological safety cabinet 
is the principle device to provide 
containment of hazardous splashes, 
splatters, and/or aerosols.   
 
Aerosols can be generated from many 
different manipulations while working 
with infectious materials.  You should 
always be working in the biological 
safety cabinet when working with 
infectious materials that can generate 
aerosols. Do your best to minimize 
aerosols.  
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Safety Equipment
 Primary barriers are designed to…
 Protect laboratory personnel and environment
 Prevent contamination of laboratory materials
 Primary barrier protectors
Primary Barriers Personnel Product Environment
Chemical Fumehood X
Class I Biosafety Cabinet X X
Class II Biosafety Cabinet X X X
Class III Biosafety Cabinet X X X
 
Primary barriers are used to protect 
laboratory personnel, protect the 
environment, and prevent 
contamination of laboratory materials. 
There are several types of primary 
barrier protectors, these include as you 
can see on the left, chemical fume-
hoods; which protect personnel, Class I 
biosafety cabinets which protects 
personnel and environment and Class II 
and III biosafety cabinets that protect 
personnel, products, and environment. 
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Safety Equipment Continued…
 Personal protective equipment (PPE)
 Gloves
 Change if contaminated or torn
 Do NOT wash or reuse in the lab
 Avoid touching face or hair
 Laboratory coats, gowns, sleeve covers, boots 
or shoe covers 
 Protect personal clothing
 Reduce risk of self contamination/exposure
 Wear closed-toe shoes and long pants
 
Personal protective equipment or PPE is 
used to protect individuals. Use of PPE 
is required whenever there is risk of 
exposure to a hazardous material. PPE 
includes gloves, keep in mind if you 
have Latex allergies alternatives will be 
made available to you. When using 
gloves you need to change them if them 
become contaminated or torn and do 
NOT ever wash or reuse gloves in the 
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laboratory, there are plenty more for 
you to use. Additionally, while wearing 
gloves avoid touching your face or hair 
or other things that may be handled 
without gloves. 
 
Other PPE includes laboratory coats, 
gowns, sleeve covers, boots or shoe 
covers which are worn to protect 
personal clothing and reduce self-
contamination or exposure. Do not wear 
open toed shoes or shorts. If you plan to 
enter the laboratory you must wear 
closed-toe shoes and long pants.  
 
 
 
 
Slide 15 
Safety Equipment Continued…
 Personal protective equipment (PPE)
 Safety glasses/goggles or face shields
 When splashes with infectious 
material may occur
 Wearing contact lenses
 Eye, face, and respiratory protection
 Manipulation of infectious materials
 Used with BSCs or as primary barrier
 
Protective eyewear, such as safety 
glasses, goggles, or face shields should 
be worn when splashes of infectious 
materials may occur or if laboratory 
personnel wear contact lenses. Eye, 
face, and respiratory protection should 
be worn if there is potential of aerosols 
or splashes generated when 
manipulating infectious materials. 
 
 
All the PPE listed here can be used with 
biosafety cabinets or as the primary 
barriers. However, PPE will vary 
depending on the level of work 
conducted, amount being used, and type 
of biological materials used in the 
laboratory.  This is because not all 
biohazardous agents are of the same 
level of virulence, pathogenicity, or 
transmissibility. 
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Safety Equipment Continued…
 Removal of protective clothing
 Break room
 Administrative offices
 Restrooms 
 Protective clothing disposal
 Do NOT take home to wash
 Laundered at CGAHR
 Disposable coats
 
Protective clothing worn in laboratory 
should be removed before leaving for 
non-laboratory areas.  Examples of 
these areas include the break room, 
administrative offices, and restrooms.  
Protective clothing should also be 
disposed of properly.  For example, 
laboratory coats are laundered by 
CGHAR; do not take them home to 
wash.  All disposable lab coats should 
be disposed of with biological waste. 
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BSL-2 Standard Practices
 READ signs at the entrance to the 
laboratory
 Restricted access 
 Entry door contains
 Authorized personnel
 Biohazard signs
 Agents present in lab
 Contact information of supervisor
 
Biohazard information is present on the 
entry door to the laboratory where 
infectious agents are present. Please 
read these signs.  
 
The entry door: contains information 
pertaining to authorization (if you are 
uncertain of your authorization make 
sure to ask). The door signs also include 
biohazard signs, information of agents 
present in the lab, and the contact 
information of the laboratory 
supervisor. Other information that may 
be included is: chemical and/ or 
radioactive hazards, restricted access, 
safety information (PPE, respirator, 
immunization, and medical 
surveillance), high voltage area, 
magnetic field area, laser hazard, UV 
hazard. 
 
In any area where door signs indicate 
that work is conducted with infectious 
organisms or other hazardous materials, 
equipment such as centrifuges, 
incubators, refrigerators, freezers, and 
analytical equipment should be viewed 
as "potentially“ contaminated unless 
specifically known to be free of 
contamination. In contrast, if no signs 
are present identifying a hazard then the 
area is considered to be free of the 
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hazard. 
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BSL-2 Standard Practices
 Biohazardous materials include
 Infectious organisms
 Bacteria, viruses, fungi, parasites, prions, etc…
 Diagnostic specimens
 Recombinant DNA
 Viral vectors, gene therapy, cloning
 Cell cultures
 Cells, tissues, blood, body fluids
 Animal or plant cells which may contain 
pathogens
 
The biohazardous materials you may 
come in contact with at ABADRU  
include infectious organisms, such as 
bacteria, viruses, fungi, parasites, 
prions, etc…, diagnostic specimens, 
recombinant DNA, cell cultures; 
meaning cells, tissues, blood, or body 
fluids, and lastly animals or plant cells 
which may contain pathogens. As a rule 
of thumb treat, all research materials as 
if they are infectious, this will produce 
safe laboratory practices. 
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BSL-2 Standard Practices
 Hazard considerations
 There are chemical hazards in the lab
 These hazards can be defined and identified
 Most chemical hazards are non-lethal, but they 
can cause injuries
 Dose, route, toxicity, and interaction dependent
 When in doubt ASK for assistance
 
The laboratories contain chemical 
hazards; these are all defined and 
identifiable in the lab. There is a 
spectrum of injury that can occur from 
chemical exposure ranging from none to 
lethal, often depending on dose 
(concentration), route of exposure, 
toxicity, and nature of the interaction 
with the body. When in doubt or if 
unfamiliar with a chemical or task ASK 
for assistance. 
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BSL-2 Standard Practices
 Wash hands frequently
 No eating, drinking, applying cosmetics or 
handling contact lenses
 Do NOT deliberately smell 
or taste materials in lab
 Use mechanical pipetting devices
 NO mouth pipetting
 
Make sure to washing your hands 
frequently in the laboratory.  This 
includes when working with any agent 
or any material in the laboratory, after 
removing gloves, after entering, and 
before leaving the laboratory.   
 
Laboratory personnel should not eat, 
drink, apply cosmetics or handle contact 
lenses in the laboratory either.   Also, do 
not deliberately smell or taste materials 
in the lab. 
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One standard microbiological practice 
is the use of mechanical pipetting 
devices.  No mouth pipetting is allowed.  
Mouth pipetting was once common in 
the 19th century and was strongly 
associated with typhoid infections. 
Pipette aids are recommended for your 
own protection. 
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BSL-2 Standard Practices
 Needles and sharps policy
 Use sharps containers
 Do NOT break, bend,                        re-
sheath or reuse syringes or needles
 Do NOT handle broken glassware directly
 Use forceps
 Avoid using damaged glassware
 
Each lab has precautions for needles 
and sharps.  Personnel should use 
sharps containers to dispose of needles 
and syringes and should not break, 
bend, re-sheath or reuse syringes or 
needles. Also, do not handle broken 
glassware directly; use appropriate, 
indirect methods to clean up broken 
glass. Most of the labs substitute 
plastic-ware when possible. 
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BSL-2 Standard Practices
 Use of chemical fumehood and biological 
safety cabinets (BSCs)
 Work at least 6 inches into hood/BSC
 Cover work surfaces with absorbent paper mat
 Maintain uncluttered work area
 Be careful not to block vents and
air flow
 Check operation before using
 
When using the chemical fumehood and 
biological safety cabinets (BSC) make 
sure to work at least 6 inches into 
hood/cabinet, cover work surfaces with 
absorbent paper, maintain uncluttered 
work area, be careful not to block vents 
and air flow, and be sure to check 
operation before using equipment 
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BSL-2 Standard Practices
 Decontaminate lab equipment
 After spills, splashes, other potential 
contamination
 Before repair, maintenance, or removal from 
lab
 Spills of infectious materials 
 Must be contained, decontaminated,           
and cleaned up
 Spill kits contain disinfectant, towels,                               
biohazards bags, & forceps                                              
 
Decontaminated equipment should be 
tagged before repair, maintenance, or 
removal from lab. Decontamination of 
lab equipment should be done routinely, 
after spills, splashes, other potential 
contamination. As well as pre- and post- 
use. 
 
Spills of infectious materials must be 
contained, decontaminated, and cleaned 
up immediately following incident. 
Procedures and guidelines are in the 
biosafety manual in each lab. IF you are 
in doubt of how to perform the 
procedure, ASK.  We will cover this in 
more detail shortly. 
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BSL-2 Standard Practices
 Disinfection procedures pre-work in the 
biological safety cabinets
 Pre-work
 Squirt down surfaces in BSC with
Roccal-D let stand for 3-5 minutes
 Follow up with 70% ethanol and wipe down all 
surfaces
 Important do NOT use ethanol first, it binds to 
proteins
 Place absorbent paper mat down after wipe down
 
When using a biological safety cabinet 
there are disinfection procedures that 
should be conducted pre and post work. 
Procedures for Pre-work involve 
squirting down surfaces in biological 
safety cabinets with Roccal-D. Let it 
stand for 3-5 minutes and wipe up area 
with paper towels. Follow up with 70% 
ethanol and then wipe down all 
surfaces. It is important not to use the 
70% ethanol first because it will bind 
any present proteins to the work 
surface, making it difficult to 
impossible to remove. Remember 
Roccal-D first!  
 
After everything is wiped down make 
sure to place an absorbent paper mat 
down in work area. If anything is 
spilled make sure to clean it up 
immediately. 
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BSL-2 Standard Practices
 Disinfection procedures post-work in the 
biological safety cabinets
 Post-work
 Use the Roccal-D to clean work area
 Follow up again with the 70% ethanol
 Make sure to clean the front and back 
of the glass on the BSC
 
After you have completed your work in 
the biological safety cabinet, repeat the 
pre-work procedure, squirting down 
surfaces in cabinet with Roccal-D. 
Again let it stand for 3-5 minutes and 
wipe up area with paper towels. Follow 
up with 70% ethanol and then wipe 
down all surfaces. Make sure to clean 
the front and back of the glass on the 
BSC. 
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BSL-2 Standard Practices
 Decontaminate infectious materials before 
disposal
 Secure materials in durable, leak-proof 
containers
 Materials need to be autoclaved
 Access to lab is restricted
 Especially when work is being conducted
 You are responsible for waste generated
 
In the laboratory, you should 
decontaminate potentially infectious 
materials before disposal.  This includes 
securing materials in durable, leak-
proof containers before transporting 
potentially infectious materials out of 
the laboratory for decontamination or 
autoclaving. 
 
Access to BSL-2 laboratories is 
restricted especially when work is being 
conducted; therefore, you are 
responsible for waste generated in the 
laboratory. 
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BSL-2 Special Practices
 Trash vs. biological waste 
 Place material in a biohazard bag if…
 Anything that came in contact with a sample of any 
source
 Blood, bacteria,  serum, virus, tissues, etc…
 Was used in the chemical hood or BSCs
 Or contact is questionable 
 Do NOT overstuff waste cans or biohazard 
bags
 Only fill bags and cans only ½- ¾ full so that the 
bags can be closed and handled easily
 
To determine the difference between 
trash and biological waste, a good rule 
of thumb is to place anything that came 
into contact with a sample of any source 
be it blood, bacteria, serum, virus, 
vaccine, tissues, etc… or was used in 
the chemical hood or BSC, or if the 
contact history is questionable in to a 
biohazard bag. Everything else is 
considered trash and will go in its 
respective receptacle.  
 
It is important not to overstuff waste 
cans or biohazard bags. Only fill bags 
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and can ½ to ¾ full so that bags can be 
closed and handled easily.  
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BSL-2 Special Practices
 Biohazard bags go to room 127 for autoclaving
 Trash will be removed by custodian or yourself
 Routine cleaning of laboratory is your 
responsibility
 Every Monday and Thursday counter tops 
and work areas are wiped down with 
1% Clorox wipes, followed by damp paper towels
 Once a month floors are swiffered
 
The biohazard bags go to room 127 for 
autoclaving. This room is shared by 
three units, make sure to be mindful of 
others. 
 
The facility custodial staff will only 
come into the laboratory to remove 
trash. If the trash needs taken out 
sooner, it is your job to remove it. The 
custodial staff also will not clean the 
counter tops, floors, or work areas in the 
laboratory. The routine cleaning of the 
laboratory is your responsibility and 
that of your lab mates. Every Monday 
and Thursday counter tops and work 
areas are wiped down with 1% Clorox 
wipes and followed with a damp paper 
towel regardless of how recently the 
area was cleaned. And then once a 
month, depending on the traffic flow, 
the floors in the lab are swiffered.  
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BSL-2 Special Practices
 Cleaning spills
 There are well-stocked spill response stations 
in each lab
 Locate prior to working in the laboratory
 Response materials for a spill clean-up must 
be appropriate for the item being cleaned
 Material Safety Data (MSD) sheet
 Found online via CGAHR chemical inventory system 
(CISPro)
 Acid or base agent
 Neutralize appropriately
 
In the event of a chemical spill, you 
should always first notify the personnel 
in the immediate area.  If you are 
unsure, always err on the side of safety 
and have personnel evacuate the area. 
There are well-stocked spill response 
stations in each lab.  Locate the station 
prior to working in the laboratory. The 
response material for a spill clean-up 
must be appropriate for the item being 
cleaned. For example, know if the 
material is acidic or basic and use the 
appropriate neutralizer respectively. 
 
 
 
98 
 
Slide 30 
BSL-2 Special Practices
 Chemical Spill
 Individual can handle <1 liter of liquid and <1 lb of solid  - if 
larger need assistance 
 Notify others in area
 Put on PPE (if not on)
 Locate spill kit
 Cover the area with chemical spill powder around the spill
 Use scoop to ensure liquid is absorbed by powder
 Place in polyethylene bag
 Wipe up surrounding area
 Place materials in bag and tag with hazardous wastes sticker
 If you do NOT know what the hazard is or if substance is 
highly hazardous, call 9-911 – activate nearest fire alarm pull 
station to evacuate building
 
To clean up a chemical spill, the general 
rule of thumb is an individual should be 
able to handle <1 liter of liquid and <1 
lb of solid - if larger assistance should 
be gathered. Make sure to notify others 
in the area when a spill occurs. Put on 
the appropriate PPE and locate the 
laboratory spill kit. Make sure to cover 
the affected area and the area around the 
spill with chemical spill powder. Once 
the powder has absorbed the chemical, 
place the powder in a polyethylene bag. 
Make sure to wipe-up the surrounding 
area and place materials used in bag and 
tag with hazardous wastes sticker. 
 
If you do NOT know what the hazard is 
or if substance is highly hazardous, call 
9-911 – activate nearest fire alarm pull 
station to evacuate building 
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BSL-2 Special Practices
 Biological Spill
 Notify others in area
 Avoid inhaling airborne materials - leave area
 Close door, post warning sign
 Remove contaminated clothing 
 Turn inside out and place in biohazard bag
 Notify lab supervisor and biosafety officer as soon as practicle
 Allow aerosols to disperse for 30 minutes
 To clean spill:
 Put on PPE
 Locate spill kit
 Cover the area with disinfectant-soaked towels and carefully pour disinfectant around 
spill
 Allow thirty minutes of contact time
 Wipe up surrounding area
 Place materials and PPE in biocontainment bag and autoclave
 
To clean up a biological spill follow 
procedures similar to cleaning a 
chemical spill. First, notify others in the 
area. Ensure to avoid inhaling airborne 
materials and leave the area.  Close the 
door and post a warning sign to make 
sure others know (this is also an 
important reason to read all signs before 
entering a laboratory). Second, make 
sure to remove contaminated clothing, 
turning clothing inside out and placing 
them in a biohazard bag. Notify the lab 
supervisor and biosafety officer. Allow 
the aerosols from the agent to disperse 
for at least 30 minutes. Put on 
appropriate PPE and locate the 
laboratory spill kit. Third, cover the area 
with disinfectant-soaked towels and 
carefully pour disinfectant around spill, 
allow thirty minutes of contact time. 
Finally, make sure to wipe up the 
surrounding area, place the materials 
used and the PPE in a biocontainment 
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bag and autoclave the contents. 
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BSL-2 Special Practices
 Spill Clean-Up …
 If spill is inside the biosafety cabinet (BSC)
 Continue running BSC during spill and clean up to contain aerosol
 Place absorbent paper on spill and soak with disinfectant
 Allow 20 minutes contact time. Wipe up spill, working from edges 
to center. Clean area with fresh paper towels soaked with 
disinfectant
 Disinfect the interior of the BSC and other equipment inside the 
BSC
 Discard contaminated disposable materials using biohazardous 
disposal procedures
 Run the BSC 10 minutes after clean-up before resuming work or 
turning the BSC off
 If you are working in a BSC and power goes off in the room or 
the BSC fan stops, leave the laboratory immediately
 
If a spill occurs inside the biosafety 
cabinet (BSC), make sure to continue 
running the BSC during spill and 
cleanup to contain aerosol. First, place 
absorbent paper on spill and soak with 
disinfectant. Allow 20 minutes contact 
time. Second, wipe up spill, working 
from edges to center. Clean area with 
fresh paper towels soaked with 
disinfectant. Third, disinfect the interior 
of the BSC and other equipment inside 
the BSC. Fourth, discard contaminated 
disposable materials using biohazardous 
disposal procedures. Continue to run the 
BSC 10 minutes after clean-up before 
resuming work or turning the BSC off. 
 
As a not: If you are working in a BSC 
and power goes off in the room or the 
BSC fan stops. Leave the laboratory 
immediately 
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BSL-2 Special Practices
 Spill Clean-Up …
 If the spill is outside the laboratory, in transit
 In a public area, do NOT attempt clean up without 
appropriate PPE
 Secure the area and keep people clear of spill
 Call a trained coworker to assist in clean-up
 Standby during the spill response and clean-up 
activity to provide information and assistance
 
If a spill occurs outside the laboratory 
or in transit between laboratories in a 
public area, and they sometimes do, do 
NOT attempt clean up without 
appropriate PPE. First, secure the area, 
keep people clear of spill. Second, call 
the biosafety officer to assist in the 
clean-up. Finally, stand by during the 
spill response and clean-up activity to 
provide information and assistance. 
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BSL-2 Special Practices
 To prevent spills, biohazardous materials must be 
placed in an unbreakable, leak-proof secondary 
container during transit 
 Materials must be stored in leak-proof 
containers during..
 Collection
 Handling
 Processing
 Storage
 Transport within facility
 Limited to Bluetongue virus, Vesicular Stomatitis virus, 
Epizootic Hemorrhagic disease virus, Rift Valley fever 
virus vaccine (MP-12)
 
To prevent spills make sure to transport 
labeled biohazardous material in an 
unbreakable, leak-proof primary 
container, inside a second unbreakable, 
lidded container. 
 
Potentially infectious materials must be 
placed in these types of containers 
during collection, handling, processing, 
storage and transport within a facility. 
Remember with in CGAHR transport of 
infectious materials is limited to blue 
tongue virus, vesicular stomatitis, 
epizootic hemorrhagic disease virus, 
and the MP-12 rift valley fever virus 
vaccine. 
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Laboratory Facilities
 Eyewash station
 Located near sink
 Emergency shower
 Locate in each lab
 Emergency equipment storage
 Know where it is located
 
That ends the procedures for in the 
laboratory. Now on to facilities in each 
lab. There are eyewash stations 
available near sinks in each lab in case 
of accidental exposure to infectious 
materials. If exposed, flush open eyes 
for 15 minutes continually and notify 
help. There are also emergency showers 
in each lab. Locate shower in case of 
accidental exposure. If exposed, remove 
contaminated clothing, shoes, and 
jewelry, because time is critical to 
prevent serious skin burns. Know the 
location of emergency equipment, 
containing first aid kits, fire 
extinguishers, and biohazardous spill 
kits, in each laboratory and keep 
unobstructed at all times. 
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Laboratory Accidents
 Causes
 Lack of training, knowledge, or experience
 Carelessness (not vigilant)
 Fatigue
 Taking short cuts
 Not enough time; working too fast
 Deciding NOT to follow safe practices
 Not believing it’s hazardous
 
Laboratory accidents can occur through 
many avoidable means. Lab accidents 
can be caused by a lack of training, 
knowledge, or experiences; if you are in 
doubt ask. They can also be caused by 
carelessness, fatigue, taking short cuts, 
working too fast, deciding not to follow 
safe practices, or an individual belief 
the material being worked with is not 
hazardous.  
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 External events
 Tornados and earthquakes
 Power outages
 Terrorism
 Internal events
 Medical  
 Fires, explosions
 Spills, splashes
 Environmental releases
Potential Emergencies
Know what to do 
before it happens
 
Anticipate potential emergencies and 
learn what to do in case of external 
events such as tornados/earthquakes, 
power outages, or terrorism and internal 
events such as medical, fire, spills, or 
environmental releases.  
 
The steps to these situations are in the 
biosafety manual. Also, ask your 
supervising researcher about his/her 
protocols in their lab.  
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Safety Committees
 Facility safety committee
 Audits laboratories and recommends 
improvements/changes
 K-State’s Institutional biosafety committee (IBC)
 Reviews biosafety and rDNA protocols
 K-State’s Institutional animal care and use 
committee (IACUC)
 Oversight of animal care and use
 
This facility works with a couple 
different safety committees. First, is the 
CGAHR safety committee, which audits 
laboratories and recommends 
improvements/changes. Second, is the 
Institutional biosafety committee (IBC), 
which reviews biosafety and rDNA 
protocols, and third is the Institutional 
animal care and Use Committee 
(IACUC) which conducts evaluations 
and oversight of animal care and use in 
the research setting. 
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Training and Injuries
 Supervisor ensures laboratory training
 Duties to be performed
 Procedures to prevent exposures
 Exposure evaluation procedures
 Training updates
 Policy/procedure changes
 Personnel report injuries/illness
 Notify Supervisor and Safety Officer
 
Your laboratory supervisor will ensure 
that you receive specific training in the 
following areas: duties to be performed, 
procedures to prevent exposures, and 
exposure evaluation procedures. Your 
laboratory supervisor will update your 
training annually or when policies or 
procedures change in this facility.  
 
IF you become injured, ill, or more 
predisposed to infection please self-
report to your supervisor and safety 
officer. Incidents that may result in 
exposure to infectious materials: Must 
be evaluated and treated according to 
biosafety manual. 
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Food For Thought
What could happen besides someone getting 
ill or hurt if these guidelines are not 
followed?
Could lose funding, collaborations,  
and/or research grants
 
So now that we have heard about all the 
things that need to be done and not done 
I’d like to present you with some food 
for thought. Does anyone know what 
could happen besides someone getting 
ill or hurt if these guidelines are not 
followed? 
 
We could lose funding, collaborations, 
and/or research grants. Therefore it is 
important for your safety, health, and 
the future research of this unit to follow 
the presented procedures and 
guidelines. 
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Everyone’s Responsibilities
 Practice safety consistently
 Be part of the unit (team)
 Seek knowledge and understanding
 ASK questions
 
It is everyone is responsible for the 
consistent practice of safety in the 
laboratory, to do this be a part of the 
unit, seek knowledge and understanding 
through good science, and ASK 
questions. 
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Appendix B – Arthropod-Borne Animal Diseases Research Unit: 
Rift Valley Fever Virus and Bluetongue Virus Overview 
Slide 1 Arthropod-Borne Animal Diseases 
Research Unit: Rift Valley Fever 
Virus and Bluetongue Virus 
Overview
USDA, ARS, Arthropod-Borne Animal Diseases 
Research Unit (ABADRU)
Center for Grain and Animal Health Research 
(CGAHR) Manhattan, KS
Prepared by Clinton Roof, MS
 
Hello and welcome to the Arthropod-
Borne Animal Diseases Research Unit: 
Rift Valley fever virus and Bluetongue 
virus Overview here at the USDA 
Center for Grain and Animal Health 
Research. 
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Objectives
 Define arbovirus, vector, epizootic, 
zoonotic, etc…
 Basic understanding of two of the main 
viruses that ABADRU works with
 Rift Valley fever virus (RVFV)
 Bluetongue virus (BTV)
 
The objectives of this presentation are 
to define some key terms associated 
with insect borne viruses as well as 
achieve a basic understanding of two of 
the main viruses that are worked with 
ABADRU. By the end, you should have 
an understanding of why research is 
conducted on Rift Valley fever virus 
(RVFV) and Bluetongue virus (BTV). 
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Definitions
 Arbovirus 
 Arthropod-Borne Virus; replicates in arthropod (insect)
 Cause or re-emerging cause of disease outbreaks in 
livestock and wildlife
 Vector
 Carrier, an organism, often an invertebrate arthropod, 
which transmits a pathogen from reservoir to host
 Epizootic
 A disease outbreak can be described as epizootic if a 
higher rate of new cases in a population occurs than 
what would be expected during a certain period of time
 
Let’s begin with a definition of 
arbovirus. Arbovirus is an arthropod 
borne virus that replicates in insects. 
Often an arbovirus is the cause or the 
re-emerging cause of disease outbreaks 
in livestock and wildlife.  
 
You will often hear that an insect that 
carries a virus is called a vector. A 
vector is a carrier or organism, often an 
invertebrate arthropod, which can 
transmit a pathogen from reservoir to 
host.  
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Additionally, you will hear that a vector 
carrying an arbovirus can result in an 
epizootic. This means that a disease 
outbreak can be described as epizootic 
if a higher rate of new cases in a 
population occurs than what would be 
expected during a certain period of time 
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Reportable Disease
 Rift Valley fever virus (RVFV) & 
Bluetongue Virus (BTV) 
 Reasons to report to Office of International 
Epizootics (OIE):
 Transmissible disease
 Potential for serious and rapid spread
 Public health or serious socio-economic consequence
 Action is taken to block movement of animals 
and animal products 
 Bans can be set for length of time
 
Now that we have some basic 
definitions lets discuss a large 
commonality that RVFV and BTV have. 
Both of these viruses cause diseases that 
are considered reportable. The reporting 
involves notifying the World 
Organization of Animal Health/Office 
of International Epizootics (OIE) that 
the disease has been identified. 
 
This is important because RVFV and 
BTV cause transmissible disease, which 
have a high potential for rapid and 
serious spread in a population and can 
also cause major public health or 
serious socio-economic consequences.  
 
Once notified the OIE can take action to 
block or ban the movement of animals 
and animal products until the outbreak 
can be controlled or contained. 
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Rift Valley Fever Virus
 History
 Scientists first isolated RVFV from blood of a 
lamb in Kenya, Africa’s Rift Valley in 1931
 Major outbreaks of RVFV have been noted 
throughout sub-Saharan Africa
 Over 70 years
 
Let’s cover Rift Valley fever virus first.  
In 1931, the virus was first isolated 
from the blood of a lamb in Kenya, 
Africa’s Rift Valley hence the name.  
Since then, RVFV has been observed to 
be widespread throughout Africa, but 
has also been documented in Kenya, 
Somalia, Tanzania, Yemen, Egypt, 
Sudan, Madagascar, Senegal, and Saudi 
Arabia.  
 
RVFV periodically causes outbreaks in 
these countries in ruminant species 
including sheep, cattle, and goat and has 
been reported in humans as well. 
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Rift Valley Fever Virus
 Enveloped single-stranded RNA virus
 Family: Bunyaviridae
 Genus: Phlebovirus 
 Genome consists of three RNA segments
 L, M, and S
 
Rift Valley fever virus (RVFV) is an 
enveloped single-stranded RNA virus 
from the family Bunyaviridae of the 
genus Phlebovirus. The genome of the 
virus is made up of three RNA 
segments, L, M, & S. These segments 
are responsible for the function of the 
virus on the cellular level.  
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Rift Valley Fever Virus
 Mosquito-transmitted viral disease 
 Mosquito transovarial (vertical) transmission
 Transmitted to offspring from mother
 Zoonotic – Affects both humans and animals
 Humans and Ruminants amplify the virus
 Rapid short viremia
 
RVFV is a mosquito (Arbo) transmitted 
viral disease. Infected mosquitos 
transmit the virus when they feed as 
well as pass the virus to their offspring 
when they lay eggs. This is also called 
vertical transmission to offspring. So 
when the mosquitos are hatched they 
are infected and have the ability to 
infect when they feed. 
  
RVFV is a zoonotic virus; this means 
that both humans and animals may be 
affected. In the case of RVFV, 
ruminants and humans amplify the virus 
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and are considered viremic (able to pass 
on the virus) in a short time period. 
 
Humans, like animals, can become 
infected by mosquito bites; however, 
humans are more commonly infected 
through contact with virus contaminated 
blood or tissue, or through inhalation of 
virus in aerosols during slaughter of 
livestock.  
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Rift Valley Fever Virus
 Humans
 Incubation period 2-6 days
 Clinical Signs
 Flu-like syndrome, hemorrhagic fever (37.8-
40ºC), strong headaches, body pain, dizziness, 
nausea, epigastric discomfort, photophobia-
retinitis, anorexia, and hemorrhage from body 
cavities
 <2% can progress from illness to death
 Recovery within 4-7 days
 
Once exposed, humans usually have an 
incubation period of 2-6 days. After this 
time, clinical signs appear and often 
include flu-like syndromes, 
hemorrhagic/bloody fever (37.8-40ºC), 
strong headaches, body pain, dizziness, 
nausea, epigastric (stomach) discomfort, 
photophobia-retinitis (strong sensitivity 
to light), anorexia, and hemorrhage 
(blood) from body cavities. Typically, 
most people will recover from the 
disease in 4-7 days, but a little less than 
2% will progress from illness to death. 
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Rift Valley Fever Virus
 Animals
 Incubation
 12-36 hours in newborn lambs
 Up to 72 hours in sheep, cattle, and dogs
 Clinical Signs
 Fever (40-42ºC), anorexia, 
lymphadenopathy, weakness, 
nasal discharge, and usually death within 36 hrs 
 Recovery
 Lambs: 90-100% mortality
 Cattle: 10-70% mortality
 Abortion is typical in 90-100% of affect ewes and cattle
 
In animals, the incubation period is 
much shorter- ranging from 12-36 hrs in 
newborn lambs (who are considered the 
most susceptible) and up to 72 hrs in 
sheep, cattle, and dogs. After this time, 
clinical signs appear and often include 
fever (40-42ºC), anorexia, 
lymphadenopathy, weakness, nasal 
discharge, and usually death within 36 
hrs. Unlike humans, 90-100% of 
infected lambs and 10-70% of infected 
cattle will die from this disease. 
Additionally, 90-100% of pregnant 
ewes and cows will abort their fetus due 
to the virus. 
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Rift Valley Fever Virus
 Life Cycle
 Rainfall is a big factor
Floodwater post 
rain
Results in mass 
hatching of 
infected eggs
Leads to 
RVFV 
outbreak
RVFV 
introduced 
and amplified 
in animals and 
people
Deposit RVFV 
infected eggs
Animals 
and 
humans 
become ill
Mosquitos 
continue 
to spread 
virus
 
The life cycle of a RVFV outbreak is 
highly correlated to rainfall. Once rain 
falls and causes floodwater, there is a 
massive surge of hatching of infected 
mosquito eggs. These new mosquitos 
begin to feed and introduce the virus to 
humans and animals causing the virus 
to be further amplified. Affected 
humans and animals become ill. 
Mosquitos continue to spread the virus 
over the population and then lay their 
RVFV infected eggs for future 
outbreaks.  
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Rift Valley Fever Virus
 Diagnosis
 Virus isolation in mice or cell culture
 Common cell cultures
 Vero E6 (African green monkey) cells
 BHK-21 (baby hamster kidney) cells
 Immunoassay
 Antigen detection
 Antibody detection 
 
If RVFV is suspected, the rapid 
diagnosis of the virus is key. Suspected 
individuals have blood or cells 
submitted to a laboratory where the 
virus, if present, is cultured and isolated 
in cells - typically in African green 
monkey or baby hamster kidney cells. 
Additionally, immunoassay can aid in 
diagnosis by detecting antigens or 
antibodies to the virus. 
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Rift Valley Fever Virus
 Turell, et al, 2008
 Demonstrated the vector competence of North 
American mosquito species
 Competent vector
 Culex tarsalis 
 Aedes vexans from Louisiana and Florida
Culex tarsalis Aedes vexans 
 
You are probably asking why is a 
disease of Africa being researched in 
the U.S.? Well in 2008, a researcher 
named Turell, and associates 
demonstrated that there are mosquitos 
in North America capable of 
transmitting RVFV. These competent 
vectors include Culex tarsalis and 
Aedes vexans species. Therefore, it is 
important for us to better understand the 
virus and the associated disease as well 
as create effective vaccines and other 
preventative measures to decrease, if 
not eradicate, the virus. 
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Rift Valley Fever Virus
 Prevention of Infection
 Attenuated and Killed Vaccines
 Vector control
 Insecticides
 Repellants
 Clothing
 Treatment
 None – supportive care
 
With that said, our current prevention 
methods of RVFV include some 
attenuated and killed vaccines that have 
variable efficacy and some vaccines can 
actually cause abortion in pregnant 
animals. Other methods include the use 
of insecticides, repellants, and clothing, 
but these methods can be cost 
prohibitive or may result in other health 
side effects. 
 
Additionally, there are no treatments 
available for individuals that become 
infected with RVFV. The best we can do 
right now is offer supportive care and 
wait as the disease runs its course. 
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Bluetongue Virus
 Midge-transmitted viral disease
 AKA – punkies, no-see-ums, and flying jaws
 Transmitted through insect bites of infected Culicoides sp. 
midge
 Unlike RVFV…
 Animal transmission from mother to offspring is rare
 Only midge to animal transmission can cause BTV to become 
endemic
 Animals (NOT humans) amplify the virus
 
Now let’s discuss Bluetongue Virus or 
BTV. Bluetongue virus is a midge-
transmitted viral disease. Midges are 
also called punkies, no-see-ums, and 
sometimes even flying jaws. 
Bluetongue virus is transmitted through 
the insect bites of infected culicoides sp. 
Unlike Rift Valley fever, animal 
transmission from mother to offspring is 
rare and only midge to animal 
transmission can cause BTV to become 
endemic. 
 
It is not a zoonotic virus and only 
animals not humans can amplify the 
virus. 
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Bluetongue Virus
 History
 Identified in South Africa in early 1930s 
following the introduction of European breeds
 First isolated in the United States in 1952
 Texas sheep
 Now known in most of the US
 
BTV, like RVFV, was identified in 
South Africa in the early 1930s 
following the introduction of European 
breeds of cattle and sheep.  
The first isolated Bluetongue virus in 
the United States, occurred in a Texas 
sheep in 1952. Now the virus can be 
found in most of the United States. 
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Bluetongue Virus
 Historically the virus has been limited 
between latitudes 40ºN & 35ºS
 Excursions out of boundary are thought to be 
due to global change
 
Historically, the Bluetongue virus has 
been limited been latitudes of 40ºN & 
35ºS. However, Bluetongue infections 
have been reported outside of this 
boundary and researchers believe it may 
be due to global change. Meaning 
insects are able to survive and 
reproduce in areas once too cold for 
them. 
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Bluetongue Virus
 Enveloped single-stranded RNA virus
 Family: Reoviridae
 Genus: Orbivirus 
 Genome consists of 10 dsRNA segments
 Encodes for 10 proteins
 
Bluetongue virus (BTV) is also an 
enveloped single-stranded RNA virus. It 
is of the family Reoviridae and the 
genus Orbivirus because it is a circular 
virus. Other viral agents that fall into 
this genus include African Horse 
Sickness virus (AHSV) and Epizoonotic 
Hemorrhagic Disease virus (EHDV) 
 
The genome consists of 10 dsRNA 
segments which encodes for 10 proteins 
needed for the virus’ survival. 
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Bluetongue Virus
 Causes diseases in both domestic and wild 
ruminants, meaning cattle, sheep, goats, 
deer, antelope, and camels
 Cannot be transmitted to humans or 
horses
 NOT Zoonotic
 NOT Contagious
 
BTV causes disease in both domestic 
and wild ruminants, meaning cattle, 
especially sheep, goats, deer, antelope, 
and camels. 
 
Bluetongue cannot be transmitted to 
humans or horses. This virus is not 
zoonotic and is not considered 
contagious, meaning if one animal is ill 
it cannot infect another animal. Only 
animals bitten by an infected culicoides 
can become ill. 
 
 
112 
 
Slide 19 
Bluetongue Virus
 Sheep
 Clinical Signs can vary
 High fever, depression, reddening of the mouth, nose 
and eyes, facial swelling, oral lesions, nasal 
discharge,  and cyanotic (blue) tongue, coronitis-
lameness, and death
 Morbidity (illness) ≈100%, mortality (death) >50%
 Abortions & stillbirths seen
 
In sheep, clinical signs can vary, it is 
not uncommon to see fever, depression, 
reddening of the mouth, nose, and eyes, 
facial swelling, oral lesions, nasal 
discharge and cyanotic (blue) tongue, 
coronitis-lameness meaning 
inflamed/irritated feet), and death. 
 
Approximately 100% of bitten sheep 
will become infected with >50% of the 
animals dying from the disease. Like 
with RVFV, it is not uncommon to see 
abortions and stillbirths from pregnant 
ewes. 
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Bluetongue Virus
 Cattle
 Clinical Signs 
 Disease is less severe, with reddening of the mouth, nose, 
and eyes, necrosis of the muzzle, and patchy dermatitis
 Decrease in milk production and causes abortions (early 
term)
 Can lead to secondary mastitis (udder) infections
 Can cause sub-clinical infection providing a source of 
virus for midges
 
In cattle the clinical signs are often less 
severe, with a reddening of the mouth, 
nose and eyes seen, as well as necrosis 
of the muzzle and patchy dermatitis 
(meaning dying skin along the nose) 
and hair loss and skin lesions are seen 
on the body.  
 
Ill cattle will have a decrease in milk 
production and the virus can cause early 
term abortions in pregnant cows. 
 
Because cattle are usually less impacted 
by the disease, it is not uncommon to 
see sub-clinical infections which can 
provide a source for midges to continue 
to spread the disease without the 
animals looking sick. 
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Bluetongue Virus
 Life Cycle
Extrinsic 
incubation period 
inside vector 
lasts 4-20 days
Infected adult vector 
bites and infects a 
susceptible ruminantHost develops a 
viremia and is 
infective to vectors 
after 2-4 days
Un-infected adult 
vector bites the 
viremic ruminant 
host
Susceptible 
Host
Infective 
Host
Transmission Cycle of BTV
Adult Female
Adult Female
 
The life cycle of BTV outbreak begins 
with an uninfected adult vector biting a 
viremic ruminant host. After 4-20 days 
of incubation the vector can now infect 
a susceptible ruminant host. It takes the 
now bitten host 2-4 days to become 
viremic and be infective to other 
vectors. This then allows the virus to 
spread across a naïve population 
forming a circle of infected vectors 
infecting susceptible hosts. 
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Bluetongue Virus
 Strains BTV- 1, 3, 5, 6, 9, 12, 14, 17, 19, 22, & 
24
 Introduced two ways
 1) infected vectors – carried by wind
 2) via infected animals
 Domestic and Exotic Strains/serotypes
 Clinical signs and disease in the United States is 
considered moderate, however…
 Europe currently has strains of virus that cause high 
death and illness in sheep and cattle alike
 
There are several different strains or 
serotypes of BTV virus that have been 
reported. These include 1, 3, 5, 6, 9, 12, 
14, 17, 19, 22, & 24. These strains are 
introduced to a naïve population in two 
ways, one) infected midge is carried or 
pushed by wind into an unaffected area 
or animals that are infected are 
introduced to an unaffected area with 
capable insects to spread the disease. 
 
Though the clinical signs and disease in 
the United States is considered 
moderate, there are strains/serotypes in 
Europe that can cause high death and 
illness in both sheep and cattle alike. 
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Bluetongue Virus
 Prevention of Infection
 Attenuated Vaccine BTV-10
 Sheep only
 Only effective against BTV-10
 California
 Attenuated vaccine for serotypes 10, 11, 17 for use 
in CA only
 Attenuated vaccine for serotypes 10, 11, 13, & 17 for 
wildlife species in CA
 Vector control
 
With that said, our current prevention 
methods of BTV include some 
attenuated vaccines that have variable 
efficacy. Currently, across the United 
States there is an attenuated vaccine for 
the BTV-stain 10 in sheep only. This 
vaccine will not protect the sheep if 
another strain is carried in by an 
infected midge. 
 
In California, there are attenuated 
vaccines for serotypes 10, 11, and 17, 
but they are approved for use in CA 
only and not the rest of the United 
States. Additionally, CA has some 
attenuated vaccines for serotypes 10, 
11, 13, & 17 for wildlife species, also 
for us in CA only. 
 
Like RVFV, there are no efficient 
treatments for animals that come down 
with BTV. 
 
Currently, one of the best means of 
controlling BTV is to control the 
vectors. There are many forms of 
larvacides and adulticides, as well as, 
reduction of standing water that can 
help reduce the competent midge 
vectors.    
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Conclusions
 Viruses
 Are complicated with involvement of pathogens, vectors, 
animals, and sometimes humans
 Can cause significant economic losses globally
 Due to animal quarantines and trade restrictions
 Control zones and movement restrictions 
 Loss of animal life and reproduction
 Rift Valley fever can strongly impact human health
 
In conclusion, both BTV and RVFV are 
complicated with the involvement of 
pathogens, vectors, animals, and 
sometimes humans. But, both are 
capable of causing significant economic 
losses globally due to animal 
quarantines and trade restrictions, not to 
mention the loss of animal life and 
reproduction. RVFV has the ability to 
strongly impact human health. And 
though RVFV is not in the U.S.  It could 
significantly affect our healthcare and 
agriculture sectors if it did appear. 
 
Because of the potential impacts of 
these two viruses and related viruses, it 
is important that groups such as the 
ABADRU continue to research them to 
develop, control, and protect public 
health as well as the U.S. livestock 
industries. These tools could benefit 
people the world over. 
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Appendix C – Field Experience Daily Log: At the USDA, CGAHR, 
and ABADRU 
5/21/2012.  8:30 AM -10:30 AM & 1:00-4:00 PM: 5 Hours 
 
 I received a tour of the United Stated Department of Agriculture (USDA) Center for 
Grain and Animal Health Research (CGAHR) facility.  I had my picture taken and received ID 
badge.  I reviewed in house safety modules including use of personal protective equipment (PPE) 
(emailed results to USDA safety officer), after hour lab use, and chemical hygiene.   I went over 
safety guidelines with Dr McVey.  I completed the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee 
(IACUC) module for Mouse/Rat research/handling (module 3), printed certificate. 
 
5/22/2012 8:30 AM -12:00 PM & 1:00-4:00 PM: 6.5 Hours 
 
 I completed the Hazard communication safety module (emailed results to USDA safety 
officer).  Completed the IACUC for Dog (module 2), Hamster (module 4), Guinea Pig (module 
5), and Rodent Aseptic Surgery research/handling (module 7), printed certificates.  I received 
email from Kansas State University (KSU) compliance office stating I had previously completed 
IACUC modules, 1,6,8,9,10 - 6/13/2010 & IRB Training Module: 1 - 7/15/2010.  The training is 
good for 3 years from finish date; I have now completed all IACUC training modules.  I attended 
a tutorial and mouse handling training at the KSU College of Veterinary Medicine (CVM) in 
Coles Hall, 10:30 AM-12:00 PM.  I received certificate stating I am approved to handle rodents 
in the KSU Comparative Medicine Group (CMG) in Mosier Hall Animal Labs.  These mice will 
be part of several studies at the Arthropod-Borne Animal Disease Research Unit (ABADRU) 
either for immunological response due to feeding Culicoides sonorensis on mice or vaccination 
purposes.   
  
 In the afternoon, I met with Dr McVey to discuss intradermal administration of both 
zoonotic agents and vaccines for infectious diseases.  We discussed safety concerns and hazards 
associated administration of zoonotic agents, such as aerosolized blow back upon delivery of an 
injection.  Meaning the zoonotic agent could be inhaled by the administrator.  We talked about 
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conducting a literature search to find what research has been done with similar delivery devices 
and the safety methods and concerns associated with this method.  I conducted a PubMed search 
and found twelve articles to be read.  I attended a meeting with the lab technicians and veterinary 
medical supervisor to discuss a series of research and data collection projects that will begin next 
week.  These projects will involve, feeding Culicoides sonorensis (midges) on mice and then 
conducting euthanasia on both fed and unfed mice.  Upon necropsy heart blood, spleen, as well 
as inguinal and peritoneal lymph nodes will be collected for analysis.  I will observe this process 
and consider methods or procedures in this lab that can be addressed to decrease occupational 
hazards associated with infectious and zoonotic agents. 
 
5/23/2012 8:30 AM -12:00 PM & 1:00-4:00 PM: 6.5 Hours 
 
 I conducted literature search for occupational hazards with Rift Valley fever virus 
(RVFV) as well as the pathogenesis of the disease.  I read the intradermal articles from yesterday 
attempting to find a suitable model for in house testing of agent delivery.  I will be meeting at 
10:30 AM to discuss this project with Dr McVey and Dr Ruder; both veterinary medical officers. 
 
 I discussed safety assessment of occupational hazards in BL-2 facilities, 
places/procedures to use care.  I learned of a PowerPoint available which discusses needless-
devices; the Pulse needle free devices (NFD).  Additionally, I learned a NFD will be available to 
use in two weeks.  During that time we can consider different dilutions (Evan’s blue dye or 
crystal violet) to visualize the delivery of the device.  We entertained thoughts on a high speed 
camera to attempt to view potential “blow back” droplets/Aerosolization of the delivery solution.  
I considered different volumes for delivery.  I spoke about models for mimicking skin in calves 
and lambs that was found in the literature.  We discussed the possibility of obtaining a 
lamb/sheep skin for testing purposes.  We also talked about using a screen or some sort of filter 
on the device to see the misting or “blow back”.   We considered the testing of various distances, 
such as if an animal moved during the application of the agent.  This raised questions such as, 
“are there different levels of wetness that can occur on the skin surface is there a chance to have 
more agent aerosolized?” We also addressed the primary concern of exploring this device’s 
potential use is the safety and health of the worker/technician.  The literature already shows that 
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administration of agents in this from work from an immunological standpoint.  However, little to 
no literature talks about the safety of administration of a live agent or a modified live vaccine.  I 
will continue to look for some examples as well as visit the PULSE NFD web page for their 
safety studies.   
 
I conducted literature searches and requested books and articles from the KSU library 
system.  I then read and summarized some documents.  I completed safety modules including, 
Blood-borne pathogens, Institutional Biosafety Committee modules 1, 2, 3, & 4, and the 
Responsible conduct of Research module.  I emailed all completed certificates to the house 
safety officer.   
 
5/24/2012 8:30 AM -1:00 PM: 4.5 Hours 
 
I arrived and filled out emergency contact information, signed and read IT use guidelines.  
I read documents to bring myself up to speed on current information regarding RVFV.  I wrote 
and organized information in regards to the intradermal device project.  I visited with Dr McVey 
about African Swine fever virus (ASFV) and its spread into Europe.  This is another virus that 
the ABADRU will consider working with in the future. 
 
5/25/2012 8:30 AM -12:00 PM: 3.5 Hours 
 
I conducted literature research and reading of articles with note taking.  The Secretary of 
Agriculture, Tom Vilsack, sent a directive for all USDA facilities to close early for the upcoming 
Memorial Day weekend.  The office closed at noon. 
 
5/28/2012 
Closed for Memorial Day 
 
5/29/2012 8:30 AM – 1:00 PM & 1:30 – 4:00 PM: 7.5 Hours 
I continued to read and reflect on articles.  I participated in a mouse study where the mice 
were anesthetized and then had their abdomens shaved.  After this was completed containers 
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with “Stocking” lids (to allow Culicoides sonorensis to feed through the mesh) were placed on 
the shaved portion of the mouse.  These containers were then velcroed for even surface area.  
The midges were allowed to feed for 30 minutes.  After which the mice were removed, 
abdomens photographed, and were recovered and returned to their housing.  The containers with 
the culicoides were stuck in a freezer so that the fed and unfed bugs could be separated and 
counted.  In a few days the mice will have blood drawn and then analyzed for immunologic 
response from the feed, in particular from the culicoides saliva.   
 
During the event I observed safety in the lab.  One thing that caught my attention was the 
gloved hands that were used to touch the mice were also used to touch face, hair, pens, pants 
(exposed when sitting in lab coat or from coat being lifted to wipe, or rub gloves on pants) and 
other equipment that had been previously been handled without gloves or were handled without 
gloves following the study period where dirty gloves had been used to handle the same 
equipment. 
 
5/30/2012 8:30 AM – 3:30 PM: 7 Hours 
 I observed the dissection and lymph node collection of previously frozen mice that had 
been euthanized for population control.  This was to allow practice of collection of lymph nodes 
and femurs for a future study where lymph nodes will be necessary for data analysis.  I discussed 
research being conducted in the laboratory.  I observed plating of viruses for detection of 
interferon with the cultured cells.   
 
From a safety stand point during my time in the lab today.  It was observed that there is a 
large number of foot traffic in and out of the BSL-2 Lab.  Including improperly clothed (open toe 
shoes) non-lab personnel, custodial staff, workers from other labs, and under-graduate workers 
with little to no lab safety training or training in proper lab procedures.  Also I observed that all 
contaminated materials are placed in autoclave bags and are needed to be moved out of the lab 
down the hall to the autoclave.  This raised the question “should an in lab autoclave be in use to 
reduce the risk?” Additionally, I noted that Rocal is used on contaminated materials and allowed 
the proper time to elapse to kill virus or virus components (24 hrs), prior to transport to 
autoclave.  However, this raised another possible issue, “if an untrained worker (student or 
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custodial staff) were to pick up the dated material forgetting the date and begin to clean 
instruments that haven’t had the proper time to set, what would be the risk?” I believe there is a 
need for new containment practices and improved training/awareness of the laboratory setting.   
 
5/31/2012 8:30 AM -3:30 PM: 7 Hours 
 
I continued reading collected documents, note taking, and organizing information.  I 
spoke with Dr Chris Lehiy about sequencing proteins from the saliva of Culicoides sonorensis.   
 
6/4/2012 8:30 AM – 4:00 PM: 6.5 Hours 
 
I continued to read, research, and write about RVFV and occupational biosafety areas in 
the laboratory.  I visited with Dr Ruder about Epizootic Hemorrhagic Disease virus (EHDV) in 
white-tail deer, antelope, and big horn sheep and its impact/rise in frequency of occurrence over 
the past thirty years across the United States.   
 
I “played” with the needle free device, learning how to operate, clean, disassemble, and 
reassemble.  I met with Dr Barb Drolet to discuss current laboratory research.  She recently spent 
3 weeks in Colorado conducting Blue Tongue Virus (BTV) research with sheep.  During this 
time she used the NFD for inoculations.  She observed that the device sprayed a lot of the 
inoculation around the injection site.  Further raising the question, “if this is a device the 
ABADRU would want to use in house for RVFV research with either a modified live or live 
agent, what would be the risk?” Dr Mark Ruder and I have discussed Materials and Methods for 
experimenting with the NFD in house and discussed both efficiency of application and safety of 
the worker conducting the application. 
 
6/5/2012 9:00 AM – 2:00 PM & 3:00 PM – 5:30 PM: 7.5 Hours 
 
I attended an all staff meeting that all research groups were required to attend.  The 
meeting discussed and explained ethics issues in research as well as ethic issues as a government 
employee.  I observed and participated in another feeding of 30 laboratory mice with culicoides.  
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This was a continuation of mouse work from the week previous.  I attended a planning meeting 
for 6/6/2012 research collection.  Discussed statistics and the importance of appropriate n values 
with both control as well as treatment groups. 
 
6/6/2012 8:30 AM – 2:30 PM & 3:00 PM - 5:30 PM: 8.5 Hours 
 
We set up and prepped for today’s data collection.  26 mice were anesthetized, had heart 
stuck for blood collection (CBC tubes), cervical dislocation to humanely euthanize, then the 
mice underwent necropsy were the inguinal and popliteal lymph nodes were collect.  Abdominal 
skin was collected (where the culicoides fed the day previous) which was stretched and placed in 
formaldehyde.  Additionally, I collected the spleens from all mice and placed in containers for 
further analysis.  Areas were prepped and cleaned for continued study trials tomorrow.  I 
continued conducting a literature review, reading text books, and supporting articles. 
 
I considered questions from 5/30/2012.  A sign was placed on the biolaboratory door 
today, stating “Emergencies only this week”, to reduce the traffic flow in and out of the lab 
during study collection.  This sign did not prevent personal from other labs, people with open 
toed shoes, or custodial staff from entering the lab without knocking or heeding to the sign.  This 
makes me believe that training is not the only issue that needs to be addressed, but all staff needs 
to learn to read signs and abide to them.  Because the reasons the individuals entered the lab 
were not of immediate importance and could have been addressed at a later time.  People need to 
read signs for their own safety, regardless of their training level.  I wonder what would occur if 
the sign stated authorized personnel only.  I posted a sign with “authorized personnel only” to 
see how many people enter the lab during tomorrow’s collection.  I continued to work on the 
materials and methods for the in house intradermal study.   
 
6/7/2012 9:00 AM – 12:30 PM & 2:30 PM – 5:00 PM: 6 Hours 
 
We set up and prepped for today’s data collection.  12 mice were anesthetized for this 
study; similar samples were collected from yesterday’s study.  I anesthetized all mice with a 
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xylazine/ketamine cocktail of 0.09 mL/k.  I also collected the spleens from all mice and placed in 
containers for further analysis. 
The sign added to the lab door the day previous, did little to prevent people from coming 
in to the laboratory.  One individual did knock on the door; however, he was not part of CGAGR 
and was a biosafety cabinet (BSC) maintenance man.  Other individuals entered at their leisure.  
This raises the issue of individuals not reading signs or paying attention to things around them… 
I believe this is an issue that needs to be addressed for safety of lab workers and supporting staff. 
 
6/8/2012 9:00 AM – 12:00 PM & 1:30 PM – 4:00 PM: 5.5 Hours 
 
 I continued to put together the intradermal device study design.  I spent time formulating 
appropriate materials and methods for the evaluation of occupational safety.  I reviewed a 
PowerPoint that Dr Dick Hesse had put together on his evaluation of needle-free devices in 
swine.   I continued writing and researching the intradermal device study design.   
 
6/11/2012 8:30 AM – 1:00 PM & 2:00 PM – 5:00 PM: 7.5 Hours 
 
 I aided in the collection of femurs and humerus from 4 mice.  The bones had the bone 
marrow removed and placed into culture dishes.  The cells will be cultured and plated over the 
next 6 weeks to achieve mast cell plates for further research.   I continued on my literature 
review, reading text books and supporting articles.   
 
6/12/2012 9:00 AM – 12:30 PM & 1:30 PM – 5:00PM: 7 Hours 
 
I attempted to go to the “gnat ranch” this morning to observe and learn how the 
Culicoides sonorensis are raised and kept for research colonies.  However, no one was in the 
laboratory at this time. 
 
I aided in anesthetizing and recovering of 12 mice for a culicoides feeding.  The 
culicoides were allowed to feed for 30 minutes.  After which the mice were removed, abdomens 
photographed, and were recovered and returned to their housing. 
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6/13/2012 8:30 AM – 1:30 PM & 2:15 PM – 5:00PM: 7.75 Hours 
 
I arrived this morning at the cell culture lab that is housed behind the CGAHR.  I met 
with Kruger Bryant, who is the microbiology laboratory technician for the CGAHR.  He is 
responsible for all lines of cell cultures that are used in the CGAHR research labs.   These cells 
range from lung, testy, kidney, heart, artery, of various wild and domestic animals.  Some of 
these lines of cells have been going for over thirty years.  This “library” of cells is housed in a 
nitroglycerin jacketed refrigerator that keeps the samples at -180 for long term storage.  I was 
told that this temperature will hold the cells for decades if necessary and when brought to the 
appropriate temperature will revive and begin dividing again.  I received a full tour of the facility 
and was allowed to observe and question the processes involved with filling orders/requests for 
the various divisions within the CGAHR.  These cell lines are very important not only with 
current ongoing research but for diagnostics involved with the zoonotic and epizootic viruses 
that affect various parts of the world.  In fact these cell lines are sometime supplied to other 
countries to aid with diagnostics when an outbreak occurs.  This is crucial and is often an 
overlooked variable in the protection of public health and animals.   
 
I attended an all staff meeting for ABADRU which is held monthly.  The purpose is to 
bring every one up to speed with projects and changes within the center.  They are currently 
working on settling in to several new labs to serve this division and discussed the necessary steps 
that will need to occur in order for the transition to be done smoothly.  Two presentations were 
giving on Current Research Information System (CRIS) projects.  These are 5 year projects with 
specific objectives and goals to be achieved or worked toward during that time period.  The 
projects presented were one for BTV and the goals with vaccinations, serotyping, diagnostics 
and other collaborations.  The second was with RVFV with similar goals and objectives.  The 
purpose is to bring the unit up to snuff with what it will be working on and so that they wrap up 
any current projects that dealt with the previous CRIS project. 
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I continued to work on reading articles and writing.  I spoke with Dr Ruder about refining 
the specifications for the intradermal project.  Tomorrow Dr Hesse from the CVM KSU will be 
visiting to discuss his experiences with intradermal devices in swine. 
 
6/14/2012 8:30 AM – 12:00 PM & 1:00 PM – 5:00PM: 6.5 Hours 
 
Meet with the ABADRU unit and Dr Dick Hesse from the KSU CVM to discuss his 
experiences with intradermal devices and their efficiency/safety.  These times provided us 
opportunity to brain storm and ask questions regarding previous work and consideration of use in 
Biolaboratory research or as an administration device of modified vaccines.   
 
I met with Dr McVey after to further discuss the information.  We decided the use of 
black or white construction paper would be helpful to place around the intradermal “gun” to 
subjectively observe either aerosolization of material, “blow back”, etc.  With a means to also 
objectives evaluate the “splatter” with surface area.  We planned to experiment with device 
tomorrow afternoon.  I am planning to meet the USDA CGHAR safety officer, JoAnne Gresens, 
tomorrow with Dr McVey at 1:30PM to get the occupational biosafety guidelines underway to 
discuss goals. 
 
I continued work on RVFV literature review.  I believe I have completed it.   I will send 
to Dr McVey and Dr Payne to see if I am on the correct tract. 
 
6/15/2012 9:00 AM – 1:15 PM & 1:30 PM – 5:00 PM: 7.75 Hours 
 
I practiced using the P-50 NFD using saline to test the various volumes and pressure 
combinations for administration.  I also learned how to clean, disassemble, and reassemble the 
device post use.  I discussed technique and process with Dr Ruder. 
 
I set up and prepped for today’s data collection with the laboratory staff.  The same 12 
mice that were anesthetized from 6/11/2012 were used.  I anesthetized all mice with a 
xylazine/ketamine cocktail of 0.1 mL/k.  These mice had a heart stick performed to obtain up to 
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1 mL of blood from each mouse.  Each mouse was then humanely euthanized according to 
IACUC protocol.  The spleens were collected from all mice and placed in containers for further 
analysis.  Photographs of mice from each group were conducted.  I met with Dr McVey and 
Joanne Gresens; the safety officer for the USDA CGHAR.  We discussed the necessity of 
producing a PowerPoint training module that could be used to teach new employees (especially 
students (high school and under-grad)) and temporary employees’ basic biosafety procedures and 
guidelines in a BSL-2 laboratory.  I will gather data and information from Joanne after my return 
from the FRONTIER field trip to the Mexico border this next week.  My task is to assemble an 
appropriate PowerPoint to with accompanying quiz (to aid with certificate of completion) 
addressing the desired biosafety guidelines and tools.  I spent the afternoon familiarizing and 
writing about the Biosafety levels (BSL), bio-containment, and the reasons for these designations 
and practices. 
 
6/18-19/2012 
 
I spent time in Las Cruces, NM. 
 
6/20/2012 6:00 AM – 12:30 PM Location Las Cruces, NM at the NMSU campus: 6.5 
Hours 
 
FRONTIER group from KSU as well as students from K-State, New Mexico State 
University (NMSU), Georgia Tech, Minnesota, and professionals from companies such as 
Cargill were also in attendance.   Dr Jason Ackleson (Ass.  Prof.  NMSU Dept.  of Government) 
gave an overview of the border.  He explained that the US-Mexico border is 1,951 miles long 
with 700 miles being fenced.  Along this border there are 25 ports of entry (POE) that processes 
approx.  50 million people, 4 million trucks, and 90 million vehicles annually.  He also stated 
that as of 2009 there are approx.  20, 119 agents that work to control the border.  Dr Ackleson 
discussed the occurrence of border control interdiction and that trade security tension is rising.  
He stated that the desire is to have a secure and free flow of trade across the US-Mexico border.   
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 After the overview the group attended a round table discussion at the Immigration Policy 
and Human Rights: Perspective from Border Communities Conference in the Corbett Student 
Union, NMSU.  The individuals represented different groups, Dr Jason Ackleson, United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS); Sarah Nolan (PICO/Café) the local border 
communities; Viki Gaubeca American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU); and Dr Joe Heymen, an 
Anthropologist from University of Texas El Paso (UTEP).  As a whole the committee discussed 
the lack of immigration reform at the national level, the increasing enforcement measures and the 
direct as well as social impact on communities in the US-Mexico border region, and the 
challenges community organizations face.   I took additional notes on the individual speakers 
during their separate speaking times.  Basically, all the speakers believe that there is disconnect 
from individuals in Washington D.C.  and the border region.  There is a belief, held by the 
ACLU, that border patrol officers use excessive force and need to be better trained.  
Additionally, there was a large push for allowing individuals who have lived in the US for a 
specific period of time, even if illegally, be granted US citizenship.  These issues impact the 
border security and could directly affect trade and commerce between the US and Mexico. 
 
12:30 PM – 7:00 PM Santa Teresa, NM United States Port of Entry (USPOE): 6.5 
Hours 
 
After the conference we caravanned to the USPOE at Santa Teresa.  We first arrived at 
the NM Border Authority and were welcomed by Marco Herrera, International Logistics 
Manager for the POE.   We then met with Officer Cooke, a US Customs and Border Protection 
(USCBP) agent.  He is an entomologist by training and runs the inspection of pedestrian traffic 
and commercial/non-commercial traffic at the POE for agricultural related products and by-
products.  He provided a tour of their onsite laboratory, which is used to analyze suspected 
products.  A power point presentation was given highlighting regulatory authorities, pests, 
disease, and the function of “safeguarding” of agriculture in the US.  We then met with a Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) inspector, who discussed how commercial/non-commercial 
freight trucks are selected, inspected, processed, and the protocol for passing/failing trucks.   
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 The group then met with David Lucero, Division Director of New Mexico Department of 
Agriculture, at the Chihuahua Regional Cattle Union Livestock Facilities.  David explained that 
the purpose of the facility is to process and pen cattle at the border he also illustrated the 
procedures for the livestock crossing.  He explained that there are an average of 300,000 head of 
cattle processed at the facility and that they are destined for feedlots in Texas, Arizona, New 
Mexico, and the Mid-Western States.  There are two facilities one on either side of the border.  
On the Mexico side the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) veterinarian and staff 
inspects and certifies health of the animals.  Upon approval of health and paperwork, the USCBP 
agents open the gate to the fence and the cattle are literally pushed across the border to the US 
facility pens.   
 
7:00 PM – 9:00 PM La Posta restaurant, Mesilla, NM: 2 Hours 
 
 The caravan next traveled to Mesilla, NM to La Posta restaurant where individuals from 
the day as well as the NM Secretary of Agriculture, Jeff Witte.  Here we discussed the events of 
the day and raised questions from things observed. 
 
6/21-22/2012 
 
I spent time in Las Cruces, NM. 
 
6/25/2012 8:30 AM – 1:15 PM & 1:45 PM – 5:00 PM: 8 Hours 
 
I arrived and met with Drs Ruder, McVey, and Drolet to receive a tour of the new 
vivarium lab that is being worked on and addressed things to be done to get the laboratory ready 
for US Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) to conduct their official inspection 
in the next few weeks.  This laboratory will allow for the housing, handling, and use of mice, 
rats, hamsters, guinea pigs, and rabbits in research trials with the live RVFV in the (BSL-2) 
facility.  We discussed the appropriate set up and safety procedures for such a lab as well as the 
required materials for this facility.  Occupational safety with this type of lab is vital for the 
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workers/researchers.  Dr Ruder will be working on the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) 
that will be required for the Bio-Safety Laboratory Procedures Handbook.   
 
I received a jump drive from Safety Officer, Joanne Gresens, containing the necessary 
materials and information necessary for producing a PowerPoint training module to teach new 
employees and temporary employees basic biosafety procedures and guidelines in a BSL-2 
laboratory.  I downloaded the material and began organizing the information.   
 
 I aided Dr Ruder with some organization of another lab that ABADRU is preparing for 
use.  I visited with Dr Lehiy about epidemiology and viremia of RVFV and the possibility of an 
infected individual bringing the virus in to the US and causing the disease to spread a question 
raised by Kurkjian, et al, 2006.  We also discussed mechanisms of delivering virus in research 
trials, such as those suggested with the NFD.  The mechanism is not necessarily the desired goal, 
but rather the proteins that illicit the immune response without having to use the insect vector.  
Safety of the administrator is a high consideration in order to establish the correct proteins.  Once 
the proteins are found then the need for a NFD, or traditional needle syringe will not be 
necessary.  Additionally, the need to keep insects to be used as a vector will be completed.   
 
6/26/2012 9:00 AM – 12:30 PM & 1:00 PM – 5:30PM: 8 Hours 
 
I began sorting and reading through the occupational biosafety material, there is a lot of 
information.  I began constructing PowerPoint presentation for ABADRU labs.  I consulted with 
Dr McVey to ensure appropriate product was being produced.   I discussed what Dr Lehiy would 
like students to know prior to beginning lab training.  I took pictures of lab equipment and signs 
for PowerPoint presentation.  I continued to work on the PowerPoint presentation.   
 
6/27/2012 9:00 AM – 1:00 PM & 1:30 PM – 5:00 PM: 7.5 Hours 
 
I continued sorting and collecting information on the occupational biosafety protocol for 
new employees.  I also continued to produce the PowerPoint presentation, writing script for a 
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speaker and ensuring flow.   I emailed the presentation to Dr Lehiy, Dr McVey, and Dr Ruder for 
feedback and suggestions. 
 
6/28/2012 9:00 AM – 12:30 PM & 1:00 PM – 5:00 PM: 7.5 Hours 
 
I arrived and aided the unit in moving and packing up an old lab and equipment to be set 
up in an available lab closer to the rest of the ABADRU labs.  I received feedback on 
PowerPoint from Dr McVey suggested adding some slides on how to handle spills in a lab to the 
lab safety PowerPoint.  He also requested an additional PowerPoint with a high school biology 
level explanation of RFVF and Blue Tongue virus (BTV) the two main arboviruses the unit 
works with.  I worked on the second presentation, up to 23 slides. 
 
I met with Dr Payne at 2:30 PM at the CVM, decided I need to reorganize my manuscript 
but that the information looked solid and that I was on a good path.  I will have a revised version 
to her next Friday.   I continued to work on presentations with critiques from the ABADRU staff. 
 
6/29/2012 9:00 AM – 12:15 PM & 1:00 PM – 4:30 PM: 6.75 Hours 
 
I arrived and met with Dr Ruder, discussed edits to the intradermal injection protocol as 
well as my rough draft.  We later met in the lab and worked the device through a range of 
dose/pressure settings (0-500 µL) and 60-120 psi to determine the best combination for the 
experiment next week.  We decided on 50 µL, 100 µL, and 250 µL to be the doses mostly likely 
to be applied in the laboratory setting.  According to the device manual a psi of 60 is ideal for 
vaccinating fetal pigs and the devices max capacity is 120 psi.  We decided to try 80-120 psi 
with a 20 psi increment for the experiment.  We decided to get a section of donated Boer goat’s 
(Capra hircus) hide out of the -20ºC freezer for manipulation and practice, on Monday.  We 
experimented with construction paper cones and Germ Juice ® to visualize splatter from 
aerosolized injection material.  We were able to visualize splatter with the device and decided it 
would be helpful for this experiment to use the cones.  I cleaned the device and reassembled it 
for storage.  I had lunch with the Unit staff today, treated by Dr McVey.  I enjoyed getting to talk 
with and hear stories from the Unit’s staff. 
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I discussed the probability of RVFV coming in to the US with Dr McVey as well as how 
other viruses have in the past and potentially could in the future.  We discussed quarantine and 
eradication protocols and their impact on society, the public’s health, and the economic 
infrastructure of the US.  This discussion made me wonder what impact an epidemic would have 
on the health care system in the US.  I continued to work on the PowerPoint presentations and 
brainstorm/come up with data sheet for the intradermal device experiment. 
 
7/2/2012 9:00 AM – 5:00 PM: 8 Hours 
 
I got the Boer goat’s (Capra hircus) hide out of the -20ºC freezer to defrost at room 
temperature.  I prepped a work area in one of the ABADRU BSL-2 laboratories and using a #40 
blade on hair clippers removed the hair off the goat hide.  I met Dr Ruder in the laboratory to 
begin experimenting with the NFD pulse “gun”.  Using a 5% crystal violet solution, made from 
powdered crystal violet, we tested various dose and pressure combinations.  With a dose of 100 
µL we started with 80 psi and observed gross pooling of the injection solution at the 
subcutaneous (SQ) level; wetness was seen.  At 100 psi with 100 µL the same observation was 
made, the dose went mostly SQ with staining seen in the dermis.  At 120 psi with 100 µL no 
pooling was observed but a large 2 cm wetness was seen; the injection solution is going SQ.  At 
a dose of 250 µL with 80 psi, pooling and wetness was seen at intradermal (ID) and SQ levels.  
At 100 psi and 250 µL a greater pooling and wetness was seen; there were some transdermal 
(TD) seen with some injections at this dose and pressure.  At 110 psi and 250 µL, pooling and 
wetness was observed.  There was also a distinct spray seen that caused injection solution to end 
up on the safety goggles, lab coats, and lab cabinets.  At 120 psi and 250 µL, a greater pooling 
was seen with a >2.5 cm diameter wetness observed.  At a dose of 500 µL and 80 psi there was 
lots of pooling seen with a good TD delivery with some superficial muscle delivery.  At 100 psi 
and 500 µL there is lots of pooling and muscle penetration observed.  At 120 psi and 500 µL 
there is no pooling but the injection solution is driven through the muscle in to the foam on the 
other side of the hide.  Each pressure and dose combination was conducted several times 
followed by a dissection of the injection site with a #20 scalpel blade.   
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Due to these preliminary observations Dr Ruder and I decided that we should focus our 
efforts on small pressure/dose combinations for this first project.  Therefore, with further 
experimentation we determined that for 50 µL a 100 psi was appropriate, for 100 µL a 90 psi 
was appropriate, and for 250 µL a 90 psi was appropriated for this study.  We decided to scrap 
the 500 µL dosing due to the penetration of the muscle during delivery at all psi settings tested; 
assuming that this volume is too large for what is practical in the research laboratory. 
 
7/3/2012 8:30 AM – 12:00 PM: 3.5 Hours 
 
I worked on the power points, writing script for the presenter.  The Sec of Ag sent a 
directive for all USDA facilities to close early for the upcoming Memorial Day weekend.  The 
office closed at noon. 
 
7/4/2012 
Closed for Independence Day 
  
7/5/2012 9:00 AM – 12:30 PM & 1:00 PM – 5:00 PM: 7.5 Hours 
 
I worked on manuscript edits from my meeting with Dr Payne.  I continued to do 
literature research focusing on epidemiology, healthcare impacts, and economic influence of 
zoonotic diseases.  I also continued to work on the PowerPoint products for ABADRU.  I 
prepared and set up for the intradermal injection experiment for tomorrow.  I updated data sheets 
for collection and organization during the experiment.  I pulled out the goat limbs from the -20ºC 
to defrost overnight.   I re-wrote and finalized the protocol with Dr Ruder. 
 
7/6/2012 8:30 AM – 3:15 PM & 3:45 PM – 5:00 PM: 8 Hours 
 
Dr Ruder and I prepped and set up for the intradermal device experiment.  I shaved and 
cleaned the goat limbs.  Using the device we followed a written protocol (see below), 
documenting, and photographing the results.  After completion of the experiment we cleaned the 
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work site and removed waste from the laboratory.  I began to document the results in excel to 
view in tables and graphs seen in Chapter 5. 
 
P50 Needle Free Injection Device Evaluation Protocol: 
1) Within 24 hours of experiment, thaw goat skin and limbs, which were stored in a sealed plastic bag at -
20ºC, to room-temperature.   
2) Lay limbs on a work bench.  Shave the injection site with a pair of hair clippers (#40 blade) and clean site. 
3) Lube, assemble, and make ready to use the P50 Microdose injection system.   
4) Attach 10 ml syringes containing either 5% crystal violet solution (crystal violet powder with deionized 
water) or Germ Juice ® (fluorescent dye) to the Luer-lock on the device.   Utilize one data sheet for each 
solution type. 
5) Wear protective eyewear, gloves, and lab coats during prep and throughout the evaluation. 
6) To administer a dose, pull trigger while holding the Microdose perpendicular to the skin and press firmly 
(this will ensure the same pressure for delivery of dose). 
7) Dose and pressurize for this evaluation with 50 µL/100 psi, 100 µL/90 psi, and 250 µL/90 psi for each 
respective combination. 
8) Prime the gun using a 500 mL Pyrex glass bottle after each adjusted dose or psi this ensures proper 
amounts of both prior to use (gun is considered primed when a consistent stream is seen). 
9) Mark injection sites with a fine tipped pen to allow visualization of the injection site as well as the 
appropriate marker for measuring observed wetness and surface splatter. 
10) Wipe clean the tip of the injection device with a paper towel in between injections to ensure no carry over 
wetness/ solution from the previous injection. 
11) Post injection, photograph the injection site.  Measure any wetness or surface splatter in millimeters.  
Observe site for pooling and note if aerosolization is seen during the injection (record in table below) 
a. If a cone is used, photograph the cone post injection.   Any droplets visualized indicate an 
affirmative for aerosolization. 
b. Record wetness if it is felt by the injection administrator during injection. 
12) After initial data is collected, use a #20 scalpel blade to cut into the injection site (marked site).  Obtain a 
picture of the dissected site and measure the injection depth. 
13) Repeat instructions 6 – 10 for each of the 12 injection sites per dose/psi combo per limb.   
14) Dispose of the goat limbs and hide via biohazard bags and take to an incinerator.   
15) Clean work area using 70% ethanol, paper towels, and Clorox wipes. 
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16) Clean device with 70% ethanol and disassemble to ensure complete cleaning.  
 
7/9/2012 10:00 AM – 5:00 PM: 7 Hours 
 
I arrived and continued to edit and work on the intradermal/transdermal device 
manuscript, organizing collected data in table form.  I also discussed results with Dr Ruder and 
what they could mean for future use of the device.  I continued to edit my field experience report 
expanding the occupational biosafety section. 
 
7/10/2012 9:00 AM –1:30 PM & 2:30 – 5:00 PM: 7.5 Hours 
 
I continued to work on my report.  I worked on figures and graphs for the intradermal 
paper.  Spoke with Dr Larson about statistical tools and appropriate tests for the data collected. 
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7/11/2012 10:00 AM – 5:15 PM: 7.25 Hours 
 
I continued to work on my MPH report.  I worked on figures and graphs for the 
intradermal paper.  I began writing the results and discussion section of the intradermal paper.   
 
7/12/2012 9:30 AM – 12:00 PM & 12:30 PM – 5:00 PM: 7 Hours 
 
I continued to edit and work on the intradermal device manuscript.  As well as finalize 
previous chapters in my report. 
 
7/13/2012 9:30 AM – 12:00 PM & 12:30 PM – 5:00 PM: 7 Hours 
 
I continued to work on the intradermal device manuscript.  I met with Dr Larson at the 
KSU CVM to verify the stats in the paper.  He made some suggestions and showed me how to 
use some other statistical tools in excel in the data attachment.  Due to a time conflict 
rescheduled my defense date to 7/24/2012 at 10 AM.  I made the necessary arrangements and 
phone calls.  I continued to write about my field experience in the report.   
 
7/16/2012 8:30 AM – 12:30 PM & 1:30 PM – 6:00 PM: 8.5 Hours 
 
I continued to work on the intradermal device manuscript.  I incorporated figures and 
tables in to the document, designating specific figures to match the text.  I emailed both the 
biosafety and the virus overview PowerPoints to JoAnne Gresens, Dr McVey, and Dr Ruder for 
evaluation of product.  I also emailed raw data from the 7/6/2012 experiment to Dr Ruder for his 
records.  I formatted the tables and figures in my report and set up my table of contents.  I 
continued working on the discussion for the intradermal paper. 
 
I completed the discussion and edits to figures and tables for the intradermal paper.  I 
plan to submit to Dr Ruder and Dr McVey this evening for their evaluation and feedback.  I then 
continued to work on Chapter 4 of my report.  I made edits and fielded ideas for the biosafety 
PowerPoint, it is almost completed. 
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7/17/2012 10:30 AM – 1:00 PM & 2:00 PM – 5:00 PM: 5.5 Hours 
 
I continued to work on presentations.  I met with Dr McVey and discussed presenting the 
PowerPoints to the ABADRU staff later this week.   I continued to finish up the last chapter of 
my report, field experience.   
 
7/18/2012 10:00 AM – 5:00 PM: 7 Hours 
 
I continued to work on quizzes for PowerPoint presentations.  I discussed the intradermal 
paper with Dr Ruder.  We decided to send the paper to the other researchers.  I worked on my 
final defense presentation. 
 
7/19/2012 10:00 AM –5:00 PM: 7 Hours 
 
I worked on my final defense presentation. 
 
7/20/2012 9:00 AM – 9:45 AM & 2:00 – 3:30 PM: 2.25 Hours 
 
I met with Dr Ruder to discuss ongoing research.  I left ABADRU mid-morning to attend 
a thesis defense at the KSU CVM.  After, I met with Dr Payne to discuss preparations for my 
defense on Tuesday.   
 
7/23/2012 9:30 AM- 4:15 PM: 6.75 Hours 
 
I worked on my final defense presentation.  I practiced my presentation in one of the 
ABADRU conference rooms to view the presentation and make sure I was within timing.  I met 
with Dr McVey to discuss my defense. 
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7/24/2012: 
I conducted my final defense for my MPH at 10:00 AM at the KSU CVM in Moiser 
N202. 
 
7/26/2012 10:00 AM – 5:00 PM: 7 Hours 
 
I worked on the edits that my committee recommended from my report.  I worked on 
finalizing the presentations and put them in a file for the ABADRU to access.   I returned text 
books and materials lent by the staff. 
 
7/27/2012: 
I attended a luncheon for myself and another intern that had completed her internship.   
 
Total: 275.5 Hours of Field Experience 
 
 
 
 
 
